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INTRODUCTION

The American State Department throughout its history .
has been the target of much criticism.

Rarely, however,

were the officials of this department subjected to such
vituperation as during the period from June of 1940 to
December of 1942.

The basis for this criticism was the

position the department took in its relations with the
Vichy government of war-time Prance.

From the moment the

department decided to maintain relations with Vichy, this
decision proved to be one of the most bitter controversial
issues of the period.
In the main, the American liberals were the most
vociferous of the many groups that were voicing criticism
of the department's attitudes and actions that subsequently
came to be called the Vichy policy.

The leaders of this

liberal public opinion were often President Roosevelt's
most ardent supporters.

The barrage of criticism at times

grew to such height that he became restive, but he never
wavered in his belief that the policy he was following was
the one best

calculated to promote our diplomatic and

military aims.
Since the war has ended there have been works devoted
to the subject, trying to substantiate either, on the one
-1-

-2hand, that the State Department was right or, on the other,
that the risk entailed was not worth the gain.

William

hanger's hook, Our Vichy Gamble, and the Hull Memoirs are
foremost works in the field to prove the State Department's
case, while Charles A. Beard and others have tried to dis
prove this stand.

For the foreign point of view, Churchill's

outstanding six volume history of the Second World War and
Robert Aron's L'Histoire de Vichy are invaluable.

In all

works that mention the subject it is often noted that "the
Liberals" were especially loud in their criticism of a
particular action.
been evaluated.

Wowhere, however, has this criticism

Whenever this criticism has been mentioned

the author has found it sufficient to insert a few quota
tions simply to prove that the liberals did have something
to say on the subject.

This has tended to show the liberal

cause as completely one-sided against the State Department.
This thesis will show this was not entirely the case.
As the former secretary of state, Cordell Hull, states
in his memoirs:
During the period of intense criticism against our
Vichy policy before the landing in Horth Africa, the
President and I labored under the handicap of being
unable to announce the advantages that were accruing to
us from that policy. We could not expose the results
of the contacts we were keeping in Vichy and in Horth
Africa or of the economic accord with Weygand. Easy
as it was to criticize, it was correspondingly hard to
give the whole story. Publishing a balance sheet of
our policy would have prejudiced the policy itself and
incited the Germans to require Vichy to reduce or

-5eliminate these contacts and negative sic their
results. Consequently, the criticism accumulated with
virtually no opposition until it solidified into a
position that no doubt will endure for years. 1
Among the many factors that should now be included in this
"balance sheet" is an evaluation of the liberal criticism of
this policy.

It is impossible to attempt to cover all this

criticism in a paper of this kind; therefore, it is limited
to five leading liberal periodicals.
These periodicals are The Hew Masses, The Nation, The
New Republic, Commonweal and The Christian Century. They
are often considered the core of liberal opinion.

The New

Masses, as a front magazine for the Communist Party, ex
pressed an extreme left-wing position.

In the center were

The Nation and The New Republic, and on the right, Common
weal and The Christian Century.

Commonweal, the Catholic

liberal magazine, has often been criticized as being too
conservative but the position this magazine took on the
Spanish Civil War, for instance, warrants its inclusion here
as a liberal magazine.

Other magazines often considered

typical liberal periodicals, such as Common Sense and The
New Leader, would have been included in this study but were
not available at this institution.
The attitudes expressed in these periodicals will be

1 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Yol.
11 (The Macmillan Company, 194-8), p. 1194-.
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considered in the light of the facts as known generally
when the events took place and then in the light of in
formation which has been revealed since the end of the war.
In conclusion the position of each periodical will then be
weighed against the State Department and the results of the
policy it followed.

CHAPTER I
THE POLICY IS FORMULATED
May-July, 1940
Although the name developed later, the elements of the
Vichy policy appear as early as May, 1940 when the Germans
ended the "Phony War" and invaded the Low Countries and
Prance.

President Roosevelt and State Department officials

were deeply concerned with the speed of the German conquests.
What would happen if Prance fell, and Great Britain were to
follow ?

This would give the Bazis control of two of the

world's largest navies at a time when the United States had
the major portion of its fleet concentrated in the Pacific,
and the advocates of a two-ocean navy had not yet won their
argument.

Domination of the Atlantic would give them the

initiative in any war with the Western Hemisphere.
These considerations made the future of the still siz
able French fleet important.

President Roosevelt expressed

his concern to Premier Reynaud on May 26 when he wrote:
While we still hope the invasion will be checked, if
the worst comes to the worst, we regard retention of
the French fleet as a force in being as vital to the
reconstruction of French colonies and to the ultimate
control of the Atlantic and other oceans and as a
vital influence towards getting less harsh terms of
peace. That means that the French fleet must not get
caught up in the Mediterranean.
Those ships in the
eastern Mediterranean must be in a position to exit

-6 -

through the Suez Canal. Those at Toulon, Tunis and
Algiers must he able to exit past Gibralter and be in
a position, if the worst comes, to retire to the West
Indies or to safe ports in the West African posses
sions. ..
Finally, if the Germans hold out alluring offers
to France based on surrender of the fleet, it should
be remembered that the offers are of no ultimate value
and that the condition of France would be no worse,
but in fact would be far stronger, if the fleet were
removed as a whole to safe places. 1
The French fleet, at this point, was relatively unscathed
and ready for action.

If France fell and the fleet were

available it would be invaluable in helping to protect Great
Britain against the expected invasion and also in keeping
the sea lanes open between England and the United States.
Further, it could neutralize the Italian fleet in the Med
iterranean and also protect the French overseas colonies.
Before the armistice was negotiated the American
government insisted that the fleet should not, under any
circumstances, be turned over to the Germans, and that if
surrender of the fleet were part of the German terms, then
the armistice should be rejected.

The State Department went

so far as to say that, "... should the French government fail
to take these steps and permit the French fleet to be
surrendered to Germany, the French government will per
manently lose the friendship and goodwill of the govern-

William L, Danger, Our Vichy Gamble (Efew York: A.
A. Knopf, 1947), p. 13*

-7ment of the United States."

2

The terms of the armistice were finally released June
23rd.

It contained 24 articles by which France was divided

into two zones, the northern half to be occupied by the
Germans while the southern half was to be wholly under French
administration.

Other terms provided that the army was to

be demobilized and all aircraft were to remain where they
were at the time of the signing.

The most important item

from the American standpoint was Article 8:
Apart from the portion which shall be left to the
French government for the protection of its interests
in its colonial empire, the French war fleet must be
assembled in ports later to be disignated; it shall
there be demobilized and disarmed under German and
Italian supervision. The selection of these ports shall
be made in accordance with the ships' home bases in
peace time. The German government solemnly states to the
French government that it does not intend to use for
its own war purposes the French fleet which will be
stationed in ports under German control, with the ex
ception of such units as may be necessary for guarding
coasts and raising mines. Moreover, the German govern
ment solemnly states that it does not intend to lay
claim to the French fleet when peace is concluded.
Apart from that portion of the French fleet (to be
determined later; which is to defend French interests
in the colonial empire, all warships now away from
France are to be brought back to France. 3
The armistice,.and especially this article, brought
forth a storm of criticism from British and American

2 Hull, op. cit., 1, 792.
Pertinax Andre Geraud , The Grave Diggers of
France (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Go.,1944),
p . 445•

-8officials.

They protested that the German word was worth

less, and demanded stronger assurances that the fleet would
not fall into the hands of the Hazis.

Admiral Darlan,

French Admiral of the Fleet, tried to reassure the British
and the Americans by issuing secret orders to the fleet.
These orders instructed the fleet to make preparations for
scuttling in the event the enemy or an "ex-ally" should
attempt to seize a ship by force. Furthermore, this order
0
was to remain in force even if contradictory orders, signed
by Darlan himself, were later issued.

4.

But even the secret

scuttling order did not set other minds at ease.

Gould not

there be, for instance, other secret orders known only to
the French to be used when circumstances changed ?

This

was just one of the many questions being asked not only by
government officials, but also by the American liberals.
American liberal criticism during this period, and for
the remainder of 194-0, dealt mainly with internal French
politics and particularly with the new regime that the
Petain-Laval group was attempting to establish.

After the

signing of the armistice, The Hew Masses claimed that
Britain now faced, "...at least a German siege in which the
larger part of the French navy, in combination with Italian

^ Robert Aron, L'Histoire de Vichy (Ottawa: Le
Cercle du Livre de France, Ltee., 1955) > p. 74-.

-9and German naval forces, will bring the contest to British
shores."

5

We know that this never happened bat it shows

the temperament of some of the liberals at the time.

In

this same article The Hew Hasses set the pattern it

was to

follow for the next year when it claimed France was

under

mined by the policies of certain men, the counterparts of
whom "...own and rule America."

Further, it stated the

French Communists were the, "...only force whose policies
were correct, and in whom the hope of the future lies."
The article ended by stating that the French defeat meant
a, "...setback to the war plans of the Roosevelt administra
tion..." and further that, "...Roosevelt shares with the
ruling circles of France and Britain responsibility for the
debacle."

Thus right from the beginning this periodical was

against the new regime in France, and against Roosevelt and
his administration.

Also, from the beginning of the period

this magazine showed marked contempt for the other magazines
we will be investigation in this

study. In one article, for

instance, The Hew Masses claimed The Nation and The Hew
Republic has been corrupted by the "bankrupt intellectuals"
they employed as writers.

5
25, W O ,

6

"How France Was Betrayed," The Hew Masses, June
pp. 4-5.

6 Ibid

-10The Hew Republic claimed the Petain group was antiliberal.

Commenting on the armistice, this magazine said

the French people and the world would not have known any
thing about the terms of the agreement if the British information office has not published them.

7
'

It should be noted

here that throughout the war one of the main fears of both
American and British officials was that all the terms of
this armistice had not been published.

After the war, how

ever, it was found that the French had revealed all the
terms to the State Department immediately after the document
was signed.

Throughout the last six months of 1940 it is

significant that both The Hation and The Hew Republic
attributed most, including the article cited above, of their
news concerning France to British sources.

Would this tend

to color the attitudes these magazines were to take in the
future ?

The reader should keep this in mind as we note

the comments that are to come in the months to follow.
/

The question of recognition of the new Petain govern
ment was never openly discussed by the American State
Department.

At the outset there had been some talk of

following the British example and allowing relations with
France to lapse.

It was realized, however, that the fate

of the French fleet could only be influenced by direct re-

^ ^ke Hew Republic, July 1, 1940, pp. 3-4.

-11presentation at Vichy.

Traditionally the American policy

of recognition had never taken into account the form or
ideology that a government professed.

The only test had

usually "been whether a government was willing to live at
peace with the United States and live up to its internation
al obligations.

At the time, it will be remembered, the

United States still recognized Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy
and other totalitarian powers such as Japan and Russia.
Thus it was decided to be the better part of wisdom to
maintain relations with France, and to do whatever could be
I

done to keep the new regime from falling completely under
the influence of the conqueror.

Our Vichy policy now

contained 3 basic points: 1.) The French fleet must not be
used against the United States; 2.) Germany and Italy must
not get control of French bases in North and West Africa
or in the Western Hemisphere; 3-) Ihe Vichy government must
be kept from going beyond the terms of the armistice into
the realm of open cooperation and collaboration.

8

On the other side of the ledger the United States would
accrue many benefits.

By maintaining an enbassy in Vichy

the United States could encourage the French by convincing
them that the Americans were behind them.

Through the em

bassy at Vichy close watch could be maintained on develop-

8

Langer, on. cit., p. 80.

-12ments within France and its colonies.

Finally, the United

States could obtain information (from its representatives)
which would otherwise not be available.
V.

On the other hand, however, as the critics were to
point out, there were many developments that would spring
from this policy that had not been reckoned with beforehand.
The cloak of legitimacy thus attained by the Vichy govern
ment was to prove invaluable to retaining the loyalty and
devotion of most of the overseas possessions.

As Gabriel

Paux, the French High Commissioner at Beirut put it, "How
could I suspect a government with which the United States
Q
continued full diplomatic relations ?"
It also helped
the Vichy government to represent General Charles De Gaulle,
who since June 18 has been recognized by the British as the
leader of the Free French resistance movement, as a
dissioent, a usurper and a traitor.

Because of the American

action, then, it was always extremely difficult for de Gaulle
to present has movement as the legitimate government of
France.
As for de Gaulle The Hew Masses said:
There is a steady flow of discredited French politic
ians— Leon ("Hon-Intervention") Blum is one of the
latest— to London where General de Gaulle operates
a French "national committee" for Churchill. Even if
de Gaulle were replaced by Blum it would not help the

^ Pertinax, op. cit. , p. 4-57.

-13prestige of this stooge committee.

10

At about the time this was written (July 9» 194-0), it should
be noted, Leon Blum was being detained in a french prison
by the Petain government.
throughout the war.

He never was to go to London

At another point The Hew Hasses claim

ed, when speaking of the armistice, that, "...he ,Hitler
tore up one of the armistice terms, permitting the French to
scuttle their ships if they were unable to run the British
gauntlet."

^

This was not true; this term was never in

serted into the armistice and was not discussed at the
armistice talks.

These two instances of obvious falsifica

tion are pointed out early to underline the fact that the
periodicals under discussion often did not have the true
facts of a case.

Throughout this thesis, it will be

indicated where these periodicals printed false facts blat
antly as the truth.

This practice was especially prevalent

during the period from June to December, 194-0.

Also, it

may seem strange that there was little liberal comment on
the ?ichy policy during this period.

This may be explained

by the fact that events effecting the policy were in con
tinual flux and it was difficult for anyone— including the
liberal writers—

^

to know what was going on in Europe at

Hew Hasses, July 9, 194-0, p. 24.
Hew Hasses, July 15, 1940, pp. 70-71 •

-14the time.

CHAPTER II
A PERIOD OP WAITING
July-Dee ember, 194-0
During the period July-December, 194-0, there were many
conflicting reports as to what was really happening in
Europe.

Por example, it was not clear, whether the French

\

had revealed all the contents of the armistice to the
Americans.

This suspicion, of course, was not revealed to

the French but it is noted in much correspondence between
high American and British officials.

Thus, the State Depart

ment was continually looking for further and stronger assur
ances from the French concerning their fleet.

Numerous

events in France, during the period, tended to make certain
acts of the Tichy government look suspicious.
The new form of government instituted on July 10 was
one of• these actions that irked the officials of
the State
i
Department and provided material for critical liberal pens.
On that date the members of the French legislature, sitting
as a constitutional convention, by a vote of 56? to 80
passed a resolution stating:
The National Assembly gives complete power to the
Government of the Republic under the signature and on
the authority of Marshal P4tain, President of Ministers,
for the purpose of promulgating, by one or more acts,
the new constitution of the French state. This con-15-
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stitution shall guarantee the right of Labor, the
Family, and the Fatherland.
It shall be ratified by
the assemblies which it shall create. 1
This decree gave Marshall Petain dictatorial powers to use
as he saw fit.

In this country, the old marshal was affect

ionately known as "the George Washington of France" and was
looked upon as the bulwark against the forces that would
have left France as a full collaborator with the Nazis.

On

the other hand, his association with such dubious men as
Pierre Laval (who introduced the decree giving Petain dicta
torial powers) was mystifying to many.

Just previous to

the establishment of the new government, Laval went so far
as to say, "Since parliamentary democracy wished to enter
the ring against Nazism and Fascism, and since it has lost
the fight, it must disappear from the face of the earth."

2

Later, in the summer of 1942, he was to go further and open
ly announce he had hopes for a German victory.

State De

partment suspicions were well founded especially after
Petain took Laval into his new government.

These suspic

ions were shared by The New Republic which commented that,
"Petain is undoubtedly a patriotic Frenchman but this
eighty-four-year-old general is not only old and tired but

■*" Paul Farmer, Vichy-Political Dilemna (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955)> p . 140.
2
Pertinax, op. cit., p. 471.

-17he is also a friend of Franco."

This magazine also con

demned him for appealing to Hitler's mercy and to his "...
Zl
honor as a soldier for an ’honorable peace'..."
Both The Hew Hasses and The Christian Century noted the
connection of the new regime and the Roman Catholic Church.
The Christian Century claimed the official paper of the
Vatican, Qsservatore Romano, had hailed the new French
political order.

In the same article it went on to say,

"The corporate state which Laval is about to proclaim is in
full agreement with Pius XI's ideas of social organization;
Petain and Weygand,

[the then French High Commissioner in

North Africa] as martial sons of the church, represent the
Roman ideal of competent administration."

The Christian

Century also noted the great significance of the Vatican
rapprochement with France was the Catholic hope that,"...
after the end of the war a Latin bloc may be formed... bound
together by a religious tie, and able to resist inundation
by a culture based upon state totalitarianism."

It added

that, "...ultimately, it would aim toward the reassertion
in Europe of a Catholic totalitarianism, unknown in modern

^ Marshal Petain previous to his inclusion in the
war cabinet of Premier Reynaud, in June of 1940, was the
French ambassador to Spain.
^ The Hew Republic, June 14, 1940, p. 844.
^ The Christian Century, July 17, 194-0, pp* 893-894-.

-18history..." ^
The New Masses also mentioned the Catholic connection:
"Significantly, it has the Vatican's blessing," hut express
ed the hope that, "The men who hold this bastard power will
not hold it for long." 7'

Later, in a description of the new

regime's leaders it described Petain as, "...one of the
architects of appeasement... a main lobbyist for Franco,"
and one who, "...helped to wreck the Franco-Soviet Treaty
that could have meant peace."

It also stated that General

Veygand told the French negotiators at the armistice talks
not to ask for the return of the two million French prison
ers since, "...they would come back and overthrow the Petain
regime."
tiated.

8

This assertion, however, has never been substan

On the contrary, one of the most persistent demands

of both Petain and Laval was the release of French war
prisoners.
In July the British decided to deal directly ("opera
tion Catapult") with the threat posed by the continued
existence of the French fleet.

On July 3 combined units of

the British fleet converged on elements of the French fleet

^ Ibid., September 25, 1940, pp. 1166-1168.
^ ^ke New Masses, July 23, 194-0, p. 16.

8 Philippe Deval, "Four Musketeers of Betrayal,"
The New Masses, July 30, 1940, p. 5»

-19stationed in Portsmouth and Plymouth in England,, and at
Alexanderia and Mers-el-Kebir in North Africa.

The ships

in English ports were taken over by an overwhelming force
which stormed the units as they lay at their piers, unaware'
that any action was pending.

The ease with which this

phase of the operation was carried out was later cited as an
example of how easily the Germans could take over the French
ships stationed in metropolitan ports once they had control
of the port area.

In North Africa the French commanders

were given an ultimatum with three choices.

Either they

could follow the English to British ports and Join them in
the fight against the Axis, or they could sail to American
ports and allow themselves to be demobilized.

If neither of

/

these conditions were acceptable then the French commanders
were given the suggestion that they should scuttle their
ships.

If none of these conditions were accepted within a

certain length of time, the English warned the French they
would fire upon them.

At Alexanderia the French commanders

allowed their ships to be demobilized in the roadstead and
put under English surveilance, but at Mers-el-Kebir the
French chose to fight.

When the smoke finally cleared at

Mers 1,500 French sailors had lost their lives, and most of
the units there were put out of action for months to come.
The resultant clamor in French official circles can be im
agined, but in the United States immense relief spread

-20through the highest government offices, for the British
action meant time had been gained to prepare for the pro
tection of the Western Hemisphere. ^
Bor the liberals, "Catapult” meant a great danger had
been lifted from our shores.

The Hew Masses said, "The re

sult has been that one great danger to the British— and
10
ultimately to the United States— has been removed."
The
Nation claimed the British attack on the French at Mers-elKabir was justified because it was an act of self defence,
but they said it was also "...obviously justified by Petain's
refusal to keep the nation's promise to turn over the fleet
to Britain in case of surrender."

11

In this instance The

Nation was not necessarily stating the true facts since
this was the British argument and even today the French will
not admit that this was the case in 1940.
After "Catapult" France broke off diplomatic relations
with the British, and American ties with Vichy became that
much more valuable.
panding Vichy policy.

Now a new feature was added to the ex
An attempt would be made to bring the

French and British closer together.

12

Before any success

^ Winston Churchill, The Second World War (Boston:
Houghton Miffling Co., 1948-19537, U p. 239.
10 The New Masses, July 15, 1940, pp. 70-71.
The Nation, July 13, 1940, p. 21.
12

Hull, op. cit., 1, p. 804.

-21could be achieved, however, General de Gaulle persuaded the
British that an attack on the French colony of Dakar could
prove profitable and would help in establishing his claim as
the rightful heir to administer the sovereignty of France.
In September the attempt was made and failed.

This action

tended to further separate the British and the French and
helped to establish in the minds of the men of the State De
partment a suspicion of de Gaulle.

The Hew Hasses immed

iately took up the cry against the Free French and Churchill
and added a new twist by asking:
"Is it possible that Lord Lothian, the British ambass
ador, connived with the administration and the State
Department to stage a demonstration off Dakar that
. would impress the American people with new and alarming
dangers to this hemisphere ?” 13
The Hation, relying on British information sources,, falsely
stated that de Gaulle decided to withdraw his troops without
provoking a fight among the French.

14

The Free French

were not only beaten off by gunfire from the beaches but
their representatives who did succeed in landing were either
arrested or killed.
Up to this point the Catholic liberal magazine Common
weal had no comment to make on the situation in France or
on the State Department’s relations with the new regime.

^
14

The Hew Masses, October 8, 1940, pp. 24-25
The Hation. September 28, 1940, p. 257 •

-22In this month Commonweal1s future position could be discern
ed indirectly by some comments that were made about de
Gaulle.

It remarked that the armistice had been carried

out by military men and that military tradition had pre
vailed ‘both inside and outside France by these same men
obeying orders.

It went on to say that de Gaulle and his

followers "...are simply volunteers in foreign service
acting on their individual responsibility... Any talk of
their being the 'real' French government is absurd."

15

Throughout the period under study Commonweal was to main
tain this position toward de Gaulle and, as we shall see, to
advocate the maintenance of the Vichy policy.
In this same month the Vichy High Commissioner of IndoChina signed an agreement with the Japanese giving them
protective rights over the Indo-Chinese railroads and
centers of transportation.

All the liberal magazines let

this incident go by without comment except The Hew Hasses
which claimed the State Department had helped the Japanese
seize Indo-China by shipping arms and airplanes to Siam
which this magazine claimed was Japan's accomplice.

In the

final analysis this magazine stated the matter was simply a
case of American and Japanese imperialism.

^

In the light

Commonweal, September 13, 194-0, p. 418.
The Hew Masses, October 1, 1940, p. 14.

-23of the American policy toward Vichy, however, this was to
prove to be a major setback for the United States when the
Japanese decided to bomb Pearl Harbor.

In the process this

seizure of Indo-China made it far easier for the Japanese
to take Hong Kong and the Philippines.
One of the most crucial periods in Franco-American
relations came in October when P^tain consented to meet
Hitler at Montoire in southern Prance.

The first hint that

a meeting was to take place came from the British.

In the

British note there was a fear expressed that the main units
of the French fleet, then based at Toulon, would be turned
over to the Germans.

17

Secretary of State Hull delivered

a strong warning to Gaston Henry-Haye, the newly arrived
French ambassador to the United States.

There was no reply

from the French and the meeting took place on the twentyfourth.

The agreement, the full text of which was not pub

lished until after the war, had among its parts such state
ments as:
The Axis powers and France have an identical interest
in seeing the defeat of England accomplished as soon
as possible. Consequently, the French Government will
support, within the limits of its ability, the measures
which the Axis powers may take toward this end. The
details of this practical cooperation will be dealt
with in a special agreement between Germany and Italy
on the one hand and France on the other.
17
X8

Churchill, op. cit,. 11, 513*
hanger, op. cit., p. 95.
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The details of the collaboration were to be worked out later
and Petain thus felt he was Justified in agreeing to the
principle of the general clauses which in fact meant agree
ing to the principle of collaboration.

He admitted this

upon his return when he broadcast to the nation that, ”A
collaboration between our two nations was considered.
accepted the principle of it.”

I

19

It was commonly supposed in this country that Hitler
had promised Prance a final peace in return for the fleet,
cession of certain bases and a repartition of the colonies.
The news issuing from Montoire and Vichy seemed so ominous
it was decided that the President should send a strong
personal note to Marshal Petain.

The note stated:

The government of the United States received from the
Petain government during the first days it held office
the most solemn assurances that the French fleet would
not be surrendered.
If the French government now per
mits the Germans to use the French fleet in hostile
operations against the British fleet, such action would
constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith
with the United States Government.
Any agreement entered into between France and
Germany which partook of the character of the above
mentioned would most definitely wreck the traditional
friendship between the French and the American peoples,
would permanently remove any chance that this govern
ment would be disposed to give any assistance to the
French people in their distress, and would create a
wave of bitter indignation against France on the part
of American public opinion.
If France pursued such a policy as that above out-

Ronald Matthews, The Death of the Fourth Re
public (New York: Praeger, 1§54-), p.

-25lined, the United States could make no effort when the
appropriate time came to exercise its influence to
ensure to Prance the retention of her overseas possess
ions. 20
Petain was a little indignant at the wording of such a
strong note but he replied:
Do answer the anxiety of President Roosevelt,
Marshal Petain desires to state that the French Govern
ment has always preserved its liberty of action and
that he (Roosevelt) knew that he might be surprised at
an appraisement as inaccurate as it is unjust. The
French Government has declared that the French fleet
would never be surrendered and nothing can justify
questioning today that solemn undertaking. 2l
The meeting and the diplomatic exchanges concerning it
were so well guarded that none of this information leaked
out and there was no liberal comment on it.

This incident

has been mentioned to point out that the liberal journals
did not have access to every type of information.

And as

has already been shown, often the information they did have
access to was not always correct.

As a final judgement on

the importance of the Hontoire meeting and its after effects
the words of Renther-Finck, Hitler's special diplomatic
delegate to Vichy, are of worthy note:
For me Montoire constitutes the greatest defeat of the
whole German policy towards France. We gained nothing
from it, and nearly lost everything we had. We did not
succeed in winning France over to our cause, nor in

20

Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped His
tory (Hew York: Harper and Co., 1951)? PP* 39-40.
^

Ibid.. pp. 40-4-1
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occupying the whole of French territory.
If there had
not been Montoire, there would probably not have been,
either an allied landing in Horth Africa, or our own
debacle there. 22
After Hontoire the President was convinced that if the
embassy in Yichy was to serve the purpose for which it had
been established then the time had come to appoint a full
time ambassador there.

Roosevelt feared that certain ele

ments in Prance, notably the Laval group, were pushing Pet
ain and the Yichy government toward full collaboration and
eventually into a war with Great Britain.

At first General

Pershing was approached but at the time he was very ill and
it was decided to invite Admiral William D. Leahy, then
governor of Puerto Rico, to take the post.

In the letter

of invitation Roosevelt said, "We need in Prance at this
time an ambassador who can gain the confidence of Marshal
Petain, who at the present moment is the one powerful ele
ment of the French government who is standing firm against
23
selling out to the Germans." ^ The President also felt,
since Leahy was a navy man, that he could get close to
those in charge of the French fleet and thus have a greater
opportunity to influence them to keep the fleet out of the
hands of the Germans.

Leahy accepted and was appointed

22 David Thompson, Two Frenchmen (London: The
Cresset Press, 1951), p. 78.
^ William D. Leahy,
Was There (lew York:
Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 6.

-27Dec ember 20.

He did not, However, arrive in Vichy until

late in January.
Liberal criticism became more defined as the year drew
to a close.

Commonweal, for instance, stated in one art

icle that, "The most effective means of opposing Hitlerism
lies somewhere between the extremes of appeasement and
outright intervention."
plicit.

24

A second article was more ex

Commenting on the Leahy appointment, it said the

admiral would be ambassador to the French government and,
"...not to the 'Vichy Government' which is a disparaging
appellation used by people outside of France to mark their
desire for barricades, suicide and vicarious heroism.
An ambassador," it added; is the best means our govern
ment has found to secure information concerning the
actions and intentions of foreign governments. We
need that information now more than ever.
It should
not be based on hearsay: it cannot be made effective
through absence. 25
The Hew Masses was consistent in its opposition to
Roosevelt and Vichy by criticizing the Leahy appointment;
"It certainly makes quite a spectacle; the great Democrat
/
26
Franklin D. Roosevelt palsy-walsy with Marshal Petain."
Later it claimed the French ruling class was looking for
time and better terms from the Germans waiting to see

P4

Commonweal, Hovember 8, 1940, p. 67.
" Ibid., December 6, 1940, p. 164.
26
The Hew Masses, December 5* 194-0, p. 4.
pc

-28which way the war would swing, adding: "That there is de
finitely such a trend is deducible from the British and
American diplomatic machinations with Vichy, of which the
appointment of Admiral Leahy is one example..."

27

Meanwhile in Vichy on December 13, Petain tricked Laval
into resigning.

Petain's main accusation was that Laval had

not kept him informed as to what was going on in the govern
ment.

In accepting Laval's resignation Petain said, "Every

time you go to Paris, I ask myself what new ruin you will
bring down on us.
po
neither do I."

The French people don't trust you and
State Department officials saw this as

a good sign for future Franco-American relations.

Before

this, however, there had been a distinct line drawn between Laval and Petain in so far as the feelings of
Washington officials were concerned.

To Roosevelt and

other officials Petain was admired because he represented,
in their minds, the strongest element standing against full
collaboration with the Germans.

Laval, on the other hand,

represented those who stood for stronger ties with the
Hazis.

The importance of Laval to the Germans can be seen

in a letter Hitler wrote to Mussolini commenting on his
dismissal.

^

In this letter Hitler says:

The Hew Masses, December 24, 1940, p. 18.

pQ

Farmer, op. cit., p. 205*

-2 9 -

The French government has dismissed Laval. The
official reasons that have been communicated to me are
false. I do not doubt for a moment that the real
reason is that General Weygand is making demands for
Horth Africa which amount to blackmail, and that the
Vichy government is not in a position to react without
risking the loss of Forth Africa.
I also consider it
probable that there exists at Vichy itself a whole
clique that approves of Weygand's policy, at tacitly.
I do not think that Petain personally is disloyal.
But one never knows. 29
The lation, in one of the few comments on the Laval dis
missal, claimed the strongly anti-lazi and pro-British
attitude of the French people, "...was the real reason for
•50
Laval's dismissal." ^

This is too simple a reason and

would have provided food for argument within France at this
time.

The Nation, apparently, did not know the real reasons

for the Laval dismissal as they are given above.
Thus by the end of the year the State Department had
weathered one diplomatic storm, Montoire, chosen to send an
ambassador to France, and had begun to define more fully
its Vichy policy.

Three of the liberal magazines under

study also began to define their editorial policies toward
the State Department and its Vichy program.

From the be

ginning The lew Masses was opposed to Roosevelt, to the
administration and to Vichy and the State Department's
attitudes toward the new regime.

^

The Nation was becoming

Welles, op. cit., p. 57.

30 T M Nation, March 22, 1941, pp. 312-313

-30definitely more and more anti-Vichy and against the State
Department's policy.

Commonweal, on the other hand, was

an advocate of the program Vichy was pursuing and thus
favored the State Department and its actions. • Both
Christian Century and The Hew Republic were against the
forces ruling Vichy but were non-commital on the State
Department and its Vichy program at this point.

CHAPTER III
THE TEAR OE DECISION'S
January-December, 1941
At no time during the period of American relations
with Yichy did the United States policy undergo such a test
of strength as during the first six months of 1941.

When

Leahy arrived in Yichy in January his instructions had
enlarged the Yichy policy and more fully defined it.

In

the first place he was instructed to gain the confidence of
both Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan, who controlled the
French fleet.

Secondly, he was to convince the French that

the best interest of France lay in the defeat of the Axis
and thus this meant staying on the American side.

Thirdly,

he was to act as a "watchdog" to make sure the French did
not go beyond the terms of the armistice.

Along this line

Leahy was to repeat "...to all and sundry that an Axis
victory would mean the dismemberment of the French empire
and reduce France to a vassal state."

Fourth, the new am

bassador was to seek renewed pledges that under no circum
stances was the fleet to be turned over to the Germans.
Leahy was also told that he was to warn the French when
ever necessary that if the fleet was turned over to the
Germans, France would forever forfeit the long-standing
-31-

-32good will and friendship of the United States. ^

Fifth,

the United States, through the Red Cross, would endeaver to
send food to France insofar as this relief would not pre
judice a British victory.

Finally, in regard to the French

Empire, the instructions said the United States desired to
maintain the status quo in the West Indies and in French
Guiana and thus all French warships in this area should he
immobilized.

As for North Africa, Leahy was to say that the

United States was sympathetic toward the maintenance of
French interests in the area and in improving its economic
condition.

In ending the instructions said the United

States was ready to assist in maintaining and improving its
economic condition in any appropriate way.

2

Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the man who replaced Laval,
lasted a brief and insignificant seven weeks.
9 Admiral Darlan, in turn, replaced Flandin.

On February
While this

political reshuffling was going on within France the ques
tion of French North Africa came up for discussion between
State Department officials and French representatives„over
seas.

Because of the lack of certain materials in North

Africa the natives were becoming restive and it was feared
the Germans might use this as an excuse to invade and take

■*" Leahy, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
2 Ibid., pp. 445-446.

-33over the area.

Also the State Department felt North Africa

should he kept free of foreign influence as long as possible
in case in the future Petain might desire to move his
government there.

With this in mind an agreement was drawn

up by Robert Murphy, the former Counselor of the Embassy in
Paris and now American Consul General for North Africa, and
submitted through General Weygand to Yichy for its approval.
After being approved by Yichy it was signed on March 10 by
American officials in Washington.
The main points of the secret agreement, which came to
be known as the Murphy-Weygand Accord, stipulated that the
United States would supply North Africa with tea, sugar and
petroleum, the three products most desperately needed by
the native population.

It was further stipulated that these

goods were to be consumed exclusively in North Africa and to
make sure that this was done American agents were to super*
vise delivery and distribution. ^ These agents, however,
as was revealed later, were to act as American spies in the
area.

In this capacity, they were not only to assure that

the American imports did not reach the hands of the Axis,
but they were also to report on the movement of trade and
all significant military and political developments.
Weygand even gave the Americans permission to have diplomat

5

Danger, op. cit., p. 135.

-34ic pouch service and use a secret code in their communica4
tions with Washington.
Until the ships began to leave
American ports for North Africa the liberals had no idea of
this agreement and it was not until after the invasion of
North Africa, at the end of 19^-2, that the agreement was
revealed by the State Department.
During March and April the liberal magazines, not know
ing of the Murphy-Weygand Accord, took potshots at other
aspects of the policy.

In particular they condemned Leahy’s

efforts to have food sent' to feed French women and children
in the unoccupied zone.

The New Masses began the offensive

by stating:
When the President accounces he will consider any
power, or gang of generals as 'allies' of his 'demo
cracy' if only they come to terms with him rather than
Hitler, he confirms in public what has bong been
obvious in practice: that the State Department has been
working feverishly to buy off wel«b known 'democrats'
like General Franco, Marshal Petain, and Maxime Wey
gand, ready to give them food, and even arms if only
they will switch sides. 5
The New Masses in its following issue came out against send
ing any food to the French because as they saw it:
...with this measure, we have the unfolding of a
policy whereby food becomes a direct diplomatic in
strument. The distinction between humanitarian and
political motivations disappears, gust as in this war
the distinction between civilian and military fronts

^ Ibid., p. 179*
^

New Masses, March 25, 19^1> p. 11*

-35has disappeared. Food, quite like guns and airplanes
becomes an acknowledged weapon of war,^
•The Nation, again citing a British source, claimed the
Germans could requisition food in the unoccupied and thus
any food the United States sent to France would benefit the
Nazis.

Before any food was sent Leahy should submit a re

port on the food exchange procedure in France since, "This
is imformation to which we are entitled, whether or not the
Nazis object to its disclosure, before we are asked to urge
Britain to modify its blockade."

7

Later in the year both

Commonweal and The Christian Century were to take stands on
this issue in opposition to The New Masses and The Nation.
For the moment Commonweal was satisfied in saying, "England
is making an even greater mistake than she did at Oran
{Mers-el-Kebir] in refusing to accept.American offers to
help relieve, among others, the wants of the Belgian and
Q
French populations."
During this same period Commonweal praised Petain and
his government by saying, "We were told that he could be a
tool of Hitler.

We find him unperturbably defending the

honor of his country and voicing a social philosophy the

6 Ibid., April 1, 1941, p. 19.
7 The Nation, April 5, 1941, pp. 397-398.

8

Commonweal, April 25, 1941, pp. 14-15•

-36antithesis of Nazism."

9

Later, in another issue, it said,

"...this is certain.

There is no legimate or constitutional
y
10
French government today save the Petain government."
This was an indirect dig at de Gaulle and The New Masses
took up the refrain "by calling the Free French, "...another
11
British phantom."
In March and April, Leahy became very suspicious of
Darlan and his frequent meetings with the Germans in the
occupied zone.

The first indication that something was in

the air came in March when Leahy was notified by British
intelligence that the damaged battleship Dunkerque was pre
paring to leave African waters presumably to head for a
metropolitan port.

When Leahy mentioned the matter to

Pltain he said he had no knowledge of such a move but upon
summoning Darlan he found the admiral had given the order
without informing him.

Immediately the order was counter

manded but it became continually more and more apparent
that Petain was not being informed about many major decisions being taken in his name.

12

Meanwhile, a revolt had

broken out against the pro-British government in Irak.

9 Ibid.« March 7, 1941, pp. 486-4-89.
10 Ibid.. April 25, 1941, pp. 14-15.
i
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-37This gave the Germans a chance to plan an intervention in
the area and in order to facilitate operations they decided
to ask-the French for certain concessions in the region,
in early May Darlan was called to Paris by Otto Abetz, the
German ambassador, to discuss the matter.

After the pre

liminary meetings showed Darlan to be submissive a meeting
was arranged with Hitler for the eleventh.

At this meeting

Hitler showered Darlan with promises of what Vichy would
obtain at the end of the war if she would cooperate now.
Accordingly, on May 27-28, Abetz and Darlan signed the Paris
Protocols.

The French promised to allow the German air

force to make use of their bases in Syria, to permit German
submarines to use the naval base at Dakar and finally to
permit the Germans to make use of French transport facilities
in Forth Africa for the supplying of their troops fighting
the British in Egypt. 15
^

When certain persons close to

Petain told him the news of Darlan's recent doings he seem
ed to indicate that he knew nothing about it.

After they

pointed out that this could lead to an open break with the
United States he consented to have Darlan and Weygand meet
with him and discuss the matter.

After a number of meetings

the opposition to Darlan and the agreement that he had sign
ed grew so intense that on June 6 he was forced to admit the

13 Danger, op. cit., p. 156.

-38protocols should be reconsidered.

A.t the next opportunity

he promised to bring them up with the Germans for discussion.

14

Though the protocols were discussed other events in

the east, where Germany had invaded Russia, took the
pressure off Darlan for the moment.
Meanwhile, the liberals were unaware of this new crisis
just as they had been unaware of the Montoire meeting and
its consequences.

Nevertheless, whether referring to the

crisis or not, The New Masses showed true insight by re
marking at the same time, "Mr. Roosevelt is now compelled
to cover up his fiasco, and he conceals it from the
American people by pronunciamentos to France which smells
15
strongly of sour grapes."
At the end of his first six months in Vichy, Leahy,
having weathered the business over the Paris Protocols,
wrote the President that, "...it is impossible to guess
what will happen in France tomorrow or the next day and al
most as difficult for me to point to any useful accomplish
ment that we have made here since my arrival six months
16
ago."
It is amusing, at this point, to speculate what
the liberals would have had to say, had they known about the

14 Ibid., pp. 157-159.
Ike New Masses, May 27, 1941, p. 17.
16
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-39Par is Protocols and this note of Leahy's.

Considering the

extent to which Darlan had brought Prance so close to open
and full collaboration with the Germans it seems amazing
that the State Department continued to do business with his
government.

On first sight this seems to be the ease, but

on second notice it is seen that this was not entirely the
whole picture, for it was fairly clear that Petain was
not in sympathy with the Darlan policy.

Sceondly, there

were many men within the government at Vichy who were openly
collaborating with the United States and providing much
information that could not have been gathered elsewhere or
under any other circumstances.

Por this reason alone the

connection with Vichy at this point seemed worth keeping.
After the invasion of Russia Lhe lew Hasses was strange
ly silent for two months on the subject of Vichy but The
Ration claimed there had been little response in Prance to
the call for volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks and the,
"...government dropped the entire plan." 17'

Again The

Ration did not have the facts straight for the French
government never officially sanctioned a volunteer brigade
to fight the Bolsheviks, rather it was the brainchild of two
rabid French Razis, Marcel Deat and Jacques Doriot.

^ Louis Dolivet, "Volcano Under Vichy," Ihe Ration
July 26, 1941, pp. 67-69.

-40Secondly, the plan was not dropped and eventually over five
thousand Frenchmen found themselves fighting on the Russian
front.

18

In the same article The Ration voiced a criticism

of the Yichy policy that was to he heard many times before
the policy was abandoned in the last days of 1942.

On this

point The Ration said:
Many persons in important positions who are now hesit
ating would never allow themselves to be identified
with Fascism.
They are undecided at present because
Yichy says that it is ’on excellent terms with the
British and the Americans.' 19
In July also, the shipment of goods to Weygand in Rorth
Africa was beginning to be noticed and The Rew Republic,
after a long period- of silence on the subject, took time to
chide the State Department by saying:
Our State Department, which is yet to score its first
success against Fascism anywhere in the world, has
been thinking, and has reached the conclusion that the
most subtle use of our oil on behalf of democracyis
to make it available to Yichy and Japan.
It smears
General Weygand with 16,000 tons of this material to
the visible distress of Prime Minister Churchill. By
these actions the State Department declares its dis
belief that France has been conquered. 20
Commonweal, at the same time, not being daunted by the
opposition building up against Vichy and the State Depart-

^ Farmer, op. cit., pp. 272-273.
19
Dolivet, op. cit.
20
Samuel Grafton, "A Rew Learned Society," The
Rew Republic, July 21, 194-1* p. 83.

-41ment's policy, continued to show its admiration for the
French government by stating, "Actually the creation of a
new order, or 'National Revolution' as the French call it,
is not an empty slogan, but a vital necessity recognized by
everyone.o." ^
In August the State Department came under the full
editorial guns of both The Nation and The New Republic.
Both these magazines came out strongly for the recognition
of General de Gaulle and his Free French Council of De
fence in London.

The Nation, noting that Yichy officials

in Indo-China had just agreed to allow the Japanese to share
their rule of the area, opened their attack by saying:
But if Vichy acted under 'duress' as Mr. Welles gently
put it, what moral does it carry for the United States?
Does it not prove— namely, that since the French
government does not exist in any real sense, attempts
to purchase its favor or give it help are nothing more
than attempts to appease Berlin.
The question this country should ask itself is not the
imbecile, self-answering question, is Vichy independ
ent ? What this country should ask is the question, is
there still time to prevent the full utilization of
French African possessions by Hitler. And if Vichy
surrendered Indo-China under duress then, on what
theory should we continue to sell oil to the Vichy
forces in North Africa ?
President Roosevelt has not put an end to the appease
ment of Hitler's disguised agents in Vichy even though
the covering has worn so threadbare that the State

21

Helen Iswolsky, "Rebuilding in France," Common
weal , July 11, 1941, pp. 270-273.

-42Department acknowledges the existence of 'duress.'

22

After this searing attack the magazine advocated that we
combine with the British and de Gaulle and raid the Nazi
and Yichy bases in North Africa.

In the next issue The

Nation let up a little by saying:
The combination of bribes and warnings applied toYichy
may for the moment strengthen the elements which
oppose full and complete collaboration with Hitler in
Africa.
That it will fail in the long run we are
certain. 23
In a long article The New Republic finally took a stand

on

the issue by stating:
Of all the outrageous attempts of the State De
partment to finger the strings of Hitler's puppets, the
appeasement of Vichy has been the most amazingly un
statesmanlike .
From the earliest days of Yichy, our policy has been at
best stupid, at worst pro-Nazi.
We, in contrast, (to the British] are officially un
aware of de Gaulle's existence...If we are to retain
any respect among the peoples not only of France but
of England, we must follow Churchill's lead...and
recognize de Gaulle as Commander-in-Chief of the Free
French and his Council of Defence of the French Empire
as an authority with power to negotiate treaties. 24
The State Department remained steadfast throughout this
period and continued to resist the pressure that was build

22

Freda Kirchwey, "The Abasement of Yichy," The
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24
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-43ing up for the recognition of de Gaulle.

Vichy, in the

eyes of the State Department officials remained the only
legitimate government of France.

The State Department's

position on this point was further strengthened by a note
from Leahy which stated:
"The de Gaulle movement has not the following in
dicated in the British radio news or in the American
press. Frenchmen with whom I can talk, even those
completely desirous of a British victory, have little
regard for General de Gaulle." 25
In conjunction with the Free French movement under
ground resistance was building up in occupied France, es
pecially after the invasion of Russia, for then the French
Communists, with their many organized cells, could play a'
full role.

In mid-1941 a wave of assassinations broke out

in France.

In retaliation the Germans began to shoot fifty

hostages for every one German killed.

There were howls of

indignation from the American press but Commonweal took an
opposing stand by stating:
We have always been unwilling to ask of the French
people that through resistance to German pressure they
submit France to total occupation and to the full
measure of German oppression.
We have been unwilling
to join with those, who from a safe distance, encourag
ed the French people to a revolt which seemed to be as
futile as it would be heroic... 26
The Nation's attack on the State Department heightened

25

Leahy, op. cit. , p. 43.
Commonweal, August 22, 1941, pp. 411-412.
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in intensity in September when it was announced that the
majority of those being executed by the Germans were
Communists.

The magazine claimed that:

...if Nazi 'order' is established in Prance, whether by
the German army or by French terrorists (the Vichy
police and others) the responsibility for that shameful
result will rest in large measure on the shoulders of
the American government and on the American people. 27
The article went on to say that the American people must
wake up to the dangers inherent in our policy of continuing
to recognize Vichy.

If the American people do wake up, the

article continued:
...the reactionary bureaucrats in the State Department
will find themselves removed to posts in the more un
important regions of the earth and an honorable, ener
getic, pro-democratic policy will be put into effect.
The article ended by again calling for the immediate recog
nition of de Gaulle and his movement.

The New Hasses came

back into the picture after three months with remarks on
* Leahy, the Vichy embassy in Washington and de Gaulle.

The

magazine rebuked Leahy for attending the proceedings where
Petain,

..formed his Fascistic legion" and criticized

the administration for allowing, "...pro-Nazi espionage
activities..." to take place at the Vichy embassy in
po

Washington.

In another article The New Hasses, after

27

Freda Kirchwey, "Which France Are We For ?", The
Nation, September 6, 1941, pp. 191-192.
28 The New'Masses, September 16, 1941, p. 20.

-45claiming de Gaulle and his Free French forces were "stooges"
and "phantoms" of the British, began to take a more concilia
tory attitude toward him by admitting he had many followers

but adding, "...where the de Gaulle party sometimes goes to
the other extreme in its nationalistic fervor, the Communists
espouse a broad internationalism." 29'

Later, as we shall

see in the next chapter, The Mew Hasses will call for the
recognition of de Gaulle and the Free French.

Some possible

•reasons why there was such a turnabout in their position
will be discussed when their call for recognition is noted.
Finally, in October, the liberals did win somewhat of
a concession when a representative of the Free French was
officially received by the State Department.

American ties

with the Free French were further extended in the following
month when the de Gaulle forces were granted the benefits
of the "Lend-Lease" act.

The President, ih a letter to the

State Department, said he had extended de Gaulle these bene
fits because, "...the defence of the territories rallied
to Free France was vital for the defence of the U.S." ^
Petain was a little irritated when he heard this news but
after calling de Gaulle a traitor and explaining his hatred

^
50

Ibid., September 9? 1941, pp. 6-8.
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to Leahy the matter was dropped.
November also saw the end of General Weygand as the
French High Commissioner in North Africa.

The Germans for

a year had been pressing Petain to get rid of Weygand and
as he (Petain) told Leahy they threatened to occupy all of
Prance, to feed the entire army of occupation on French
foodstuffs direly needed by the French themselves and event
ually to starve the population by this method if Weygand was
51
not removed. ^

The State Department immediately retaliated

by suspending all economic aid to North Africa but since the
German offensive had bogged down on the Russian front it
was feared their attention might be turned to Africa and
the suspension was quietly lifted after only two weeks.
Only The Nation took space to comment on the dismissal.
They said, "Petain has thrown away his one face card," and
predicted the marshal would be pushed further because he
had agreed to the Nazi demands.
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The importance the

Germans were supposed to have attached to Weygand was pro
bably exaggerated for Hitler said after his dismissal,
"There are so many Weygands in France that any one of them
could take over the role of the old retired general to-

51

Leahy, op. cit., p. 59*

^ Jal Allen, "Exit Weygand," The Nation, November 29,
1941, pp. 555-536.

-47morrow," ^
The fateful month of December, 1941 was to prove one of
the most pressing months in the history of this country's
foreign relations.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor the

importance of the French fleet became even more paramount
since it was now felt it could more positively tip the
scales to which ever side its commanders decided to fight
with.

The Nation and The New Masses continued their attack

and began to call for drastic action on the part of the ad
ministration.

The Nation, in a full front page editorial,

said, "The men in the State Department who engineered the
policy of appeasement— are full partners in the guilt of
Pearl Harbor.”

It went on further to say:

The President has not yet convinced himself that the
Munich mind operates with fatal effect in the Depart
ment of State just as it did in the Foreign Office.
He still reposes confidence in men who have lost the
confidence of the public. 34The New Masses said Pearl Harbor had shown clearly that the
policy of appeasement was played out and thus the United
States should:
...take the initiative, take over the French colonies,

Galeazzo Giano, Ciano1s Diplomatic Papers, edit.
Malcolm Muggeridge, trans. Stuart Hood (London: Odhams
Press, 1948), p. 462.
^ Freda Kirchwey, "Partners in Guilt,” The Nation,
December 27, 1941, p. 656.

-4-8such as Martinique and the islands off Newfoundland,
take over French Guiana, and prepare to move across,
via the Azores, to Dakar itself. 55
Commonweal, on the other hand, proposed that the State
Department maintain its present position.

The writer of

this article claimed that those who would throw the present
policy, "...are driving the French into Hitler’s arms.”
Further, the article stated, "Doubtless on the day we
break with France we will recognize de Gaulle as the head
of the French government; certainly that day we will recognxze Hitler as the spokesman for Europe."
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Thus the year drew to a close but not without one
last salvo.

This time it was the turn of the Free French,

for while all eyes were on the west coast in anticipation
of a Japanese invasion it came on the eastern shores of St.
Pierre and Miquelon where de Gaulle had decide to take
matters into his own hands.

^ The New Masses, December 9, 194-1* P« 19*
56
C.G. Paulding,. "Toward a Policy," Commonweal,
December 5* 1941, p. 159.

CHAPTER IV
THE 'SO-CALLED' AFFAIR OF S T . .PIERRE-MIQUELON
With liberal criticism building up for the past
twelve months and so many crises happening at once December
appeared to be the worse month members of the State Depart
ment would face for a long time.

The final crisis came on

Christmas Eve when news reached Washington that St. Pierre
and Miquelon Islands had been invaded.

The new crisis came

from a quarter which until this point seemed hardly worthy
of attention.

It was directly because of this lack of

attention, however, that General de Gaulle decided to send
three warships under Admiral Emile Muselier to invade the
Vichy held possessions of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

These

island, which lie just off the eastern coast of Newfoundland,
the Free French claimed were sending radio signals and
weather information to large German submarine packs that
lay in wait throughout the area.

De Gualle, writing after

the war, said he had decided to provoke the affair, "... in
order to stir up the bottom of things, as one throws a stone
into a pond." ^

At the time no one could have done a better

job of "stirring up" things.

^ de Gualle, op. cit. , p. 216.
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-50The immediate reaction of the State Department can he
seen in a note that was issued to the press as soon as the
news reached Washington.

The note, which was signed by

Secretary of State Hull, read in part:
Our preliminary reports show that the action taken by
three so-called Free French ships at St, Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement
of all parties concerned and certainly without the
prior knowledge or consent of the United States Govern
ment .
This government has inquired of the Canadian
government as to the steps that government is prepared
to take to restore the status quo of these islands. 2
This note, and especially its reference to three "...socalled Free French ships...", was to raise a stir among the
liberals that has rarely if ever been equalled.
Before investigating the criticism that surrounded this
event, however, a brief look at the facts that surrounded
the invasion and the aftermath of the invasion is necessary
in order to understand the underlying issues that were not
always apparent at first glance.

In the week previous to

the invasion, the State Department had signed an agreement
with Admiral Georges Robert, the Vichy representative at
Martinique, guaranteeing the status quo of French possess
ions in the Western Hemisphere.

In return the French agreed

not to ship back to France over twenty million dollars in

^ Robert Bendiner, The Riddle of the State Depart
ment (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p.92.

-51gold that had been deposited on the island when the war
broke out or to transfer any military equipment from the
French possessions to the homeland.

They also agreed not to

allow Nazi submarines to land at Martinique.

A medical

emergency was the only reason they could use for landing
and this had to be confirmed by American naval authorities.
All of these agreements were known as the Martinique
Guarantee.

Also, during this week, Admiral Muselier had

approached the Canadian government for permission to take
over the islands.

The Canadians, after listening to his

plan refused to allow him to go ahead without the prior
approval of the United States.

Muselier then paid a visit

to Pierrepont Moffat, the American ambassador to Canada,
and explained his plan.

Moffat vetoed the idea and then

Muselier asked permission to go to Washington to plead his
case, but was refused a visa. ^
During the same period, de Gaulle had assured the.
British that "...no orders for the operation had been issued
and that it would not be carried out by the Free French
naval forces.'1

h.

This note was sent on the seventeenth and

the following day de Gaulle sent the following note to

3 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
4

Robert L. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An
Intimate History (New York: Harper Company, 194-8), p. 482.

-52Admiral Muselier:
I order you to proceed and rally Saint-Pierre and
Miquelon "by means at your own disposal and without con
sulting foreigners.
I take the responsibility for this
operation which has become indispensable to the perservation for France of her possessions. 5
Thus it is readily seen that de Gaulle was notbeing

faith

ful to his friends and allies, the British.
Besides all the afore-mentioned, the State Department
also had to keep in mind the obligation the United States
had entered into when it signed the Havana Convention in
194-0.

In part this convention outlawed, "...the use of

force to effect the transfer of sovereignty possession, or
control of any territory in the Americas held by belligerent nations,"

6

Added to all this, the President had sent

a personal message to Marshal P^tain noting Vichy France's
proclamation of neutrality after war broke out between the
United States and Germany stating:
You may rest assured the Governmentof
the United
States under present circumstances and in view of the
instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert
will continue to give full recognition to the agree
ment reached by our two Governments involving the
maintenance of the French possessions in the Western
Hemisphere. 7
Under such circumstances the State Department was forced to
5

Thompson, op.cit., p. 185.

^ Danger, op. cit., p. 185.
7 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
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denounce the Free French action,

The term "so-called" was

unfortunate, however, since it was subject to misinterpreta
tion and appeared to convey the meaning that the Free French
were misrepresenting themselves,
Roosevelt and Churchill, at the time, were in the midst
of the Arcadia Conference in Washington,

For Churchill

this was his first meeting with the American secretary of
state and he was struck by the fact that, "...amid gigantic
events, one small incident seemed to dominate his mind."

8

The President was somewhat amused at first by the incident
q
and called it a "teapot tempest," y Later, however, when
the criticism of the State Department reached such an in
tensity that many of the department's highest officials
threatened to resign the President took a different view of
the matter.

Also, in such critical times Roosevelt could

ill afford to have doubt cast upon the actions of the
government.

For Hull the St. Pierre-fliquelon affair, from

the beginning, was, "...one of those footnotes of history
that had dangerous possibilities of becoming whole chap
ters."
To heighten the State Department anxiety Admiral Leahy

® Churchill, op. cit., 111, p. 666.
9

Sherwood, op. cit., p. 488.

10 Ibid., p. 4?9.

-54reported from Vichy that:
Darian referred to the St, Pierre-Miquelon in
cident and said that the Germans had already used the
seizure of those islands by de Gaulle as an argument
for the entry of Axis troops into Africa in order that
it may be protected against similiar invasion, H
The Vichy government, however, in an official communique
noted with,
Government

satisfaction the news that the Federal
{in Washington] has publicly condemned the in

itiative taken against its knowledge and sentiment by former
12
Admiral Muselier,"
The Nation was the first of the liberal magazines under
study to take the State Department to task for the position
it was maintaining.

In a front page story it said:

The evidence indicates that the State Department act
ed on its own, pursuing with imbecile consistency its
fixed policy of yielding to Vichy, snubbing the Free
French and ignoring the contrary advice of Britain,
It then went of to say that,
without the least delay the President should de
mand the resignation of the officials who on their own
say-so betrayed the cause to which this country has
been pledged not only by the terms of the Atlantic
Charter but in many pronouncements by the President."
Was The Nation implying that the President was unaware of
some of the committments the State Department was making ?
In one section it called for an inquiry into all the State

11
12

Danger, op. cit., p. 218.
Sherwood, op. cit., p. 482.

-55Department's actions in regard to Vichy, especially to see
whether its officials had agreed to hold for Vichy the
French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

If this were

found to he true, the article continued, the President,
.should find out quickly what it implied in terms of
action."

It warned that, "If the President fails to act,

the dictators will have gained one of the decisive victories
13
of the war."
It is rather odd that the writers of this
magazine could think that the President was unaware of
what his own officials were doing.

Secondly, it is another

good example of the lack of knowledge of these magazines
about certain events.

It is apparent here, for instance,

that The Nation knew nothing about the stipulations of the
Martinique Guarantee.

This, however, was not surprising

since the commitment was secret.

The Havana Convention, on

the other hand, had been published when it was signed.
Notice, however, that there is no mention of the justifica
tion of the State Department's actions on the basis of the
Havana Convention but rather allusions are made only to a
possible mutual committment the Department might have made
with Vichy.
In this same issue the editors of The Nation sent a

^ Freda Kirchwey, "Mr. Hull Should Eesign," The
Nation, January
1942. pp. 1-2.
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telegram to Admiral Muselier which stated:
You and the Free French forces and the people of
St. Pierre and Miquelon have the unqualified support
of all patriotic Americans who feel nothing hut shame
at their government's betrayal of our common cause.
Hold fast. Destiny has put the defense of freedom in
your hands and you cannot afford to yield or compro
mise.
The Admiral, in reply, said:
The Admiral-in-Chief commanding the Free French
naval forces, the marine volunteers, the immense major
ity of the population of St. Pierre and Miquelon thank
you with all their hearts for your telegram.
I knew
it was not possible that the noble American nation
would not be wholeheartedly with us in the cause of
Liberty and in the sacred right of peoples to selfdetermination. What ever happens we will hold on
until the end. For all democracies of the world St.
Pierre, like your Statue of Liberty, is a symbol. 14
Another article in the same issue of The Nation express
ed its dissatisfaction by saying that Hull's "so-called"
statement was, "...a stupidity that calls for his removal."
This article went on further to say:
The State Department could not have chosen a better
way to undermine the confidence of oppressed peoples
everywhere than by its slur, and I think some way
should be found to let the world know in decisive
fashion that the undemocratic little clique of decay
ed pseudo-aristocrats and backsliding liberals who
dominate the State Department do not speak for the
American people. 15
This writer also made the mistake of claiming both the

14

The Nation, January 5s 1942, p. 2.

^ I.F. Stone, "Aid and Comfort to the Enemy," The
Nation, January 3? 1942, pp. 6-7.

-57British and the Canadian governments had knowledge of and
had consented to the operation.
lic made the same mistake.

A writer for The Hew Repub

He condemned the secretary's

statement and said: "The truth about the State Department is
not that its motives are evil but that some of its personnel
16
are ignorant."
The Hew Masses was satisfied simply to
ask for a clarification of the whole Vichy policy in the
light of the many contradictions inherent in our attitude
toward the Yichy regime on the one hand and our relations
with the Free French on the other.

The writers for this

magazine were extremely cogent in their presentation of
the case and knowledge of the facts.

The big question for

The Hew Masses was whether, "...the policy toward Vichy may
not actually contradict our basic anti-Axis strategy..."

17
1

Commonweal. for the first time not openly and completely
agreeing with the State Department, noted its,surprise and
shock at the State Department note but added, "...whether
purposely or not, the action taken by the Free French at St.
Pierre and Miquelon seriously interferred with our recent
negotiations with the French government.

It is obvious

that we cannot accept such interference, if the essence of

16
^

The Hew Republic, January 3, 194-2, p. 3The Hew Masses, January 6, 194-2, p. 18.

-58any policy be coherence."

18

In the first week of January the officials of the State
Department and the President became extremely irritated at
Admiral Muselier's insistence that he be allowed to remain
on the islands.

To substantiate his claim that he was there

through the hospitality of the people, and by their choice,
a plebiscite was held among the island population.

The re

sults of the plebiscite showed over ninty-eight percent of
the people favored the Free French.

Vichy spokesmen,

however, claimed the people were coerced and all Free French
opponents jailed.

The next move on the part of the United

States was a threat either to force the Free French out
of the islands or to starve them out.

The President agreed

to all of these proposals, even suggesting the latter one.

19

Department officials also claimed during this period that
the Hull statement was not aimed as an insult at the Free
French but had been so worded because the invasion report
had not been confirmed at the time the statement was issued.
Hull himself, however, further confused the issue by stating
that the term "so-called" referred not to the Free French
but to the ships.

20

This statement led one writer to

Commonweal, January 9, 199-2, p. 284.
19

20

Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 488-489.
lew Masses, July 25, 1942, p. 69.
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comment, "Unless it turns out that the Admiral [sic] and his
crew approached the islands on surf hoards, this quaint' ex
planation will save very little face; and that is as it
should be."

21

In the meantime Hull and other department

officials in trying to build up their case made reference
to the Havana Convention, however they omitted any mention
of the clause which outlawed the taking over of any terri
tory in the ’
Western Hemisphere by force.

In its place de- .

partment officials had substituted another clause which
stipulated that "no non-American state should be permitted
to attempt directly or indirectly, to replace another nonAmerican state in the sovereignty...which it exercised over
any territory located in the Americas,"

When this note was

published, The Nation, sustaining its attack, replied:
The absurdity of classifying the
even if it had not been endorsed
imous vote of the population, as
ty is obvious to any but a State

Free French coup,
by the almost unan
a change of sovereign
Department mind. 22

The New Republic, now completely anti-State Department,
claimed the use of the Havana Convention to maintain
Yichy's sovereignty, "...implies that the United States is
playing Hitler's game,"

23
v

This was an extremely harsh

^ The Nation, January 17, 194-2, pp. 50-51*
22
Ibid,, January 10, 194-2, p, 22.
^

The New Republic, January 12, 194-2, p. 57*

-60statement for the period if one remembers that the United
States had Just gone to war with Germany only a few weeks
before.

The Nation's next comment continued this same line

of thought when it asked, "Are we against Hitler and his
puppets or are we against the people who are fighting
him ?”

24

At this point The Nation also claimed, "The

Communist Party is backing the action of the State Depart
ment in rebuffing the de Gaullists on the seizure of St.
25
Pierre and Miquelon." ^
The New Masses, which followed the Communist Party
line very closely, took many different stands on de Gaulle.
Before the German invasion of Russia, it will be remembered.
The New Masses called the Free French movement a "stooge"
committee and a "phantom" of the British.

After the in

vasion, and the expulsion of the Russian ambassador from
Yichy for espionage, The New Masses took a more concilliatory attitude toward the Free French movement.

But it must

be remembered that de Gaulle and his movement always repre
sented a threat to the plans the Communists had for France
in the future.

During the war the Communists were the

strongest group within the underground movement in France

^ Freda Kirchwey, "Free ard So-Called Free," The
Nation, January 24, 1942, pp. 82-83.
^

^ke Nation, January 17, 1942, p. 65»

-61and controlled most of the active groups that were not
directly affiliated with them.

This strength they hoped to

maintain after the war and to help de Gaulle was to under
mine themselves.

Nevertheless, from June 1941 to June 1942,

when things were going badly on the Russian front, any
enemy of the Nazis was a friend of the Russians.

This might

be the reason why The New Hasses was soft pedalling de
Gaulle at the moment.

On the St. Pierre-Miquelon Islands

affair this magazine did not support the Tree French but
neither did it oppose them.

It did, however, continue to

criticize the State Department for its relations with Vichy.
In what obviously looked like an attempt to save face,
the State Department finally ruled on February 13 that the
Havana Convention did not apply in the case of St. PierreMiquelon.

The true point of the matter, however, was that

no country, not even the United States, had officially in
voked the Convention.

This announcement did, however,

invoke some comment from The New Masses and it will suffice
to show how one of the magazines felt just before the issue
was finally settled.

The New Masses, in a long article,

asked:
What is State Department policy toward the Free French
occupation of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon ?
Nobody knows, not even those supposed to be directing
it...This game of now-you-see-it-now-you-don't is only
one more evidence of the utter bankruptcy of the
appeasement policy with which the State Department
career boys have been trying to buy themselves into

-62the affections of the old men of Yichy.

OC-\

The issue was finally settled in March when Admiral Musel
ier was recalled under pressure from both Great Britain and
the United States.

Before long he was engaged in a long and

hitter quarrel with de Gaulle and in the end he resigned
his position as the highest ranking Free French naval
officer.

After Muselier left, the islands were taken under

joint supervision by the United States and Canada for the
remainder of the war.

Thus ended the comic opera incident

of the St. Pierre-Miquelon Islands affair but not before it
had nearly done damage to the Anglo-American Alliance and to
relations with the United States administration.

De Gaulle,

by this move, only increased the mistrust of him and his
movement held by the State Department.

The British also

began t o .take a more cautious view of him.

To some American

liberals de Gaulle was the darling of the freedom movement
but to others, if he did not sit next to the right hand of
the devil he was close to it.

^

Hew Masses, February 24, 1942, p. 11.

CHAPTER V
THE ROAD IS CHOSEN
January-November, 194-2
While the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident was at its
height there were many other developments going on to
plague the American Secretary of State.

The accumulation of

so much strife in such a short length of time prompted Hull
to consider resigning.

In his memoirs he states, "I so

seriously considered resigning that I pencilled out a note
to the President tendering my resignation." ^

The liberals,

writing in the magazines under study, that had called for
this resignation had no idea how close they came to realiz
ing their hopes.
storm.

Hull stayed on however, and weathered the

Nineteen forty-two was not, however, to prove to be

a calm and serene year by any means.

It had been ushered

in under a storm of criticism and was to end in just the
same fashion.
The Nation aside from its articles on St. Pierre-Hiquelon in January reviewed the entire Vichy policy.

It con

cluded that the United States had gained absolutely nothing
from this policy and had lost much.

^ Welles, op. cit., p. 64
-63-

The Nation claimed;

-64This record of the State Department policy to
ward Vichy indicates that our diplomats have become
so involved in what they no doubt consider a policy
of the greatest cleverness that they have lost sight
of basic principles.
It might be worthwhile to hang
in every office of the State Department a sign read
ing:
"De Gaulle is fighting against the Axis. P^tain
is a prisoner of the Axis. Nothing the United States
can do will alter these two facts. 2
The Nation, even though its writers were concentrating on
the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident, continued to pound away
at the whole Vichy policy never letting up from its origin
al denunciation.

Commonweal also continued to be the only

magazine that consistently advocated that we maintain the
Vichy policy and all that it implied.

In January, Common

weal praised Leahy and said, "He stands in the gateway of
Europe with his foot there to keep the door from closing..

In February the French battleship Dunkerque sailed
quietly off to Toulon from its North African base in de
fiance of a promise given to Leahy ten months earlier.

In

this same month a German submarine stopped at Martinique
to disembark a sick sailor and left before United States
authorities could investigate.

There were also reports of

continued use of French transport facilities in North

2

Waverly L. Hoot, "Vichy Bait for Washington,"
The Nation, January 17i 1942, pp. 5&~58.
x
C.G. Paulding, "Our Embassy in Vichy," Commonweal,
January 16, 1942, p. 309.

-65Africa by the Germans.

These events rankled official

Washington to such a degree that it was decided to take a
decisive stand with Yichy.

Leahy at this point was so dis

gusted with the constant bickering going on with the French
that he requested to be recalled.

No one, Leahy felt, be

lieved the United States would ever take any positive action.
The time had therefore come when the United States must
show that it was not bluffing.

The President was of another

mind, however, and decided to give the French one more
chance. In a note to Petain on February 11 he stated:
There can be no justification under the terms of
the armistice for the shipment of war materials or
other direct aid to the Axis powers, and without
official assurances from the Yichy Government that no
military aid will go forward to the Axis in any theater
of war and that French ships will not be used in the
furtherance of their aggression, Admiral Leahy will be
instructed to return immediately to the United States
for consultation as to our future policy. ^
No magazine made any comment on these events until the
following month after Petain had once more agreed to ad
here to the terms of the armistice and make sure no assist
ance was given to the Axis.

The Nation was again the first

to note the new Vichy assurances and. pledges by claiming the
State Department had set a "new high in incredulity" in
5

accepting them. ^

q
^

The New Masses claimed that, "Of all the

Langer, op. cit., pp. 235-256.
Nation, April 4, 1942, p. 382.

-66prepost erous ignominies in the history of umbrella diplomacy,
this takes the cake.”

Later in the article the writer call

ed the Vichy policy a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside
an enigma."

6

It should be noted at this point that the

American goyernment repeatedly was being forced to ask
assurances from Vichy and that every time Petain obligingly
pledged that the assurances would be met.

After a while,

however, repeated guarantees that are not fulfilled wear
thin.

Thus the liberals seem justified in feeling a sense

of disgust that the State Department would continue to be
duped by these seemingly false promises.

The State Depart

ment, however, had also reached that point and only needed
one small incident to recall its ambassador.

This incident

finally occurred in April when Laval was brought back into
the government replacing Darlan as Petain1s right hand man.
Before this happened, however, the United States'es
tablished a consulate at Brazzaville in Free French North
Africa and The New Hasses threw its entire support behind
de Gaulle and his movement.

In the article in which The

New Masses finally supported de Gaulle there was no explan
ation of why the magazine had decided to take this position.
This was the custom for this magazine since, as has been

^ Joseph Starubin, '"Whitewashing Vichy," The New
Masses, April 7» 194-2, p. 13.

-67noted, it often contradicted a previous stand without ex
plaining why.

On this occasion the magazine simply said:

As things stand today, our policy still contradicts
that of Britain and the Soviet Union. How long will
it take the State Department to remember that the
people of France are fighting Hitler and that the
„
least we can do for them is to recognize de Gaulle ? 1 ,
Also during February The Nation began to question where
Roosevelt himself stood on appeasement.

The magazine an

swered its own question by stating that official Washington
was divided into three groups on the question of appease
ment. The first group, the article states, is made up of
people friendly to Fascism, "particularly of the Catholic
variety, who would give Spain and Vichy anything they want."
The second is made up of those who are opposed and in the
middle "are those who think it necessary to dole out limit
ed quantities of supplies to Vichy and Franco to keep them
from joining the Axis."

The President, the magazine said,

belongs to this immediate group. 8

This statement was

unique for up until this time the magazine had hinted that
the President was not aware of much that was going on in
his own government.

This statement seems to imply that

indirectly the President was responsible for the Vichy
policy.

Notice, however, that The Nation never comes out

^

New Masses, February 3? 19^-2, p. 19

^

Nation, February 28, 1942, p. 247.

-68into the open directly accuses Roosevelt of being respons
ible for what was going on in the State Department.
The Vichy policy reached another of its major crises
in mid-April when the Germans decided to test their dip
lomatic strength against the United States.

As the Germans

saw it the only reason Laval was being excluded from the
Vichy government was the insistence by Washington that his
inclusion would mean the recall of the American ambassador.
The Germans decided to test this theory by painting a grim
picture of future Franco-German relations unless Laval was
immediately brought back into the government.

The Germans

won on April 15 when Marshal Petain reinstated Laval with
the title of Chief of the Government which gave him the
power to issue decrees on his own signature alone.

State

Department officials were horrified at this action and
immediately sent instructions to Leahy to return to Washing
ton for consultations.

Laval, it will be remembered, repre

sented to the State Department that group in France which
looked for closer collaboration with the Germans.

Laval,

for instance, upon the entry of the United States into the
war stated that he felt the United States had committed a
serious error in entering the war.

As he saw it if Great

Britain and Russia were victorious over Germany then,
"Bolshevism in Europe would follow inevitably."

Under such

circumstances he said he would prefer to see Germany win the

-6 9 -

war. 9

Immediately after taking office in April he said in

another statement, "We are placed before this alternative;
Either become a part of the new Europe or resign ourselves
to disappearing from the civilized world.”

Even though

one of these statements may seem prophetic today, to the
State Department officials of the time they represented the
mouthings of a man who would stoop to anything, even to
collaborating with the enemy, to gain his own ends.

The

State Department's case was emphatically put by Under Sec
retary of State Welles when he said in reference to Laval
and his group:
...that handful of Frenchmen who, in contempt for the
tradition of liberty and individual freedom which has
made France great, have sordidly and abjectly, under
the guise of 'collaboration' attempted to prostitute
their country to that very regime which is bent upon ,
nothing less than the permanent enslavement of France.
State Department officials knew that Laval was considered by
the Germans to be the only man in France capable of bring
ing the French over to full collaboration.

Proof that they

were right was found after the war in one of Goebbel's
diaries when, in commenting on the Laval reinstatement, he
said it, (the reinstatement), "is a tremendous advantage for

9 Langer, op. cit., p. 250.
Bendiner, op. cit., p. 97*
11 Ibid., p. 98.

-70us, and for that reason it is causing alarm in London and
in Washington.'1

12

The Nation reacted immediately to the news and claimed
that:
The change at Vichy, indicating as it does complete
subservience to Berlin, represents a serious diplo
matic defeat for the State Department.
The effects
of which can only be offset by a complete reversal
of its appeasement policy. 13
In another article it said:
It is good that the United States government is being
forced at last to abandon the pretense that it, not
Hitler, was handling the strings attached to the
puppet.
It is good that our attempt to persuade the
French people of our friendship while we snubbed their
leaders, and bribed and cozened sic their betrayers
has at last collapsed: the end of equivocation is at
last in sight. 14In still a third article this magazine recommended that we
pull out of France entirely, diplomatically, and to recog
nize de Gaulle.

The writer felt that any future relations

with Vichy, even though our ambassador was to be recalled,
would require working with Laval and this would brand
>

America as a helpmate in any future collaboration with the

Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 194-2-194-3
edit, and trans. Louis P. Lochner^ (Garden City, lew York:
Doubleday and Co., 194-8), p. 129»
The Nation, April 18, 194-2, p. 4-45.
T4

Freda Kirchwey, "Laval Takes Over," The Nation
April 25, 1942, pp. 477-478.
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Germans.

The New Republic also described the Laval re

instatement as a diplomatic defeat for the State Department
and claimed,
"...we played at diplomacy with Yichy and aided it month
by month to brew the poison of collaboration in the dispair
of a defeated people."

16

The New Masses, after saying,

"and so the State Department policy of playing ball with
Marshal Petain comes to its ignoble denouement as we always
said it would," called for a break in relations and immediate

recognition of the Free French. 17'
Commonweal, as usual, disagreed with these three mag

azines and took a peculiar stand on the Laval issue.

In the

first part of the article the magazine stated, "Laval has
returned to power and we do not judge his intentions.

Not

improbably he is moved by a desire to serve his country."
Later in the article, however, the writer states that he
is against Laval because German pressure brought him back
into power.

The German pressure to bring Laval back, the

article ends, came, "...not from a failure of American pol
icy— our presence in Yichy— but from the relative success

15

Louis Fischer, "Laval and Roosevelt," The Nation,
April 25, 19^-2, pp. 486-487.
The New Republic, May 4, 1942, p. 602.
^

The New Masses, April 28, 1942, p. 19.

-72of that policy and from an intense desire to bring it to
1

an end."

In June Commonweal clarified its position by

stating:
We based our position on a primary necessity of main
taining contact with the people of France, and through
them with all the peoples now subject to German rule
in Europe, and we intended through this contact to
uphold their hopes of liberation. 19
The plea in this article was to keep relations open even
though Leahy had been recalled.
In this same month of June Laval publicly stated, "I
forsee a German victory" and went on to add that the allied
cause was lost.

20

With this statement Laval lost all

chance of finding any further sympathy, if ever there had
been any, within the State Department and certain liberal
circles,

low the majority of the liberal Journals were to

concentrate on gaining complete recognition for de Gaulle
and to discrediting the previous State Department relations
with Yichy and the simple ties that remained.

Again, The

Nation led the attack by an early article which stated in
part:
Laval openly expresses a hope for a German victory,
nevertheless, we are resuming supplies to North
Africa, we continue official relations with a govern-

Commonweal, April 24, 1942, p. 4.
19 Ibid.. June 17, 1942, p. 197.
20
Thompson, op. cit., p. 79.

-73ment headed by a man whom our secretary of state
acknowledges to be a German puppet, and our cold
shoulder is still turned toward the Free French who
are fighting and dying on our side.
Is there some
method in this madness ? We fail to see it unless
there is lurking within the State Department the
same fear that Laval expressed in one of his speeches
— the fear that a German defeat will mean a Europe
overrun by Bolshevism. 21
Later the smae magazine said, concerning the Vichy policy,
"The whole relationship has been a fraud, somewhat perverse,
totally impotent."

22

The Hew Republic, continuing to

fight strongly for Free French recognition, claimed, "The
Free French are getting the rawest deal of any group assoc
iated with the United Rations in this war."

Furthermore,

the article stated the State Department had given the Free
French, "One of the dirtiest deals in the whole cynical
history of secret diplomacy."

23

At the end of July efforts

were again somewhat rewarded, however, when the United
States recognized de Gaulle as the leader of the Free French
But this recognition did not mean that he represented the
sovereign government of France.
It was rather easy to say de Gaulle represented the
true feeling of the French people and that the United States
21

The Nation, July 4, 1942, p. 1.

22

Freda Kirchwey, "Toward a Break With Vichy," The
Nation, July 25, 1942, p. 65.
23

Varian Fry, "Justice for the Free French," The
New Republic, June 8, 1942, pp. 785-787.

should recognize him as an ally.

But there was no way of

testing the French public opinion to find out if this was
true and many officials in the State Department doubted it.
From all indications coming from United States representa
tives abroad agreement was unanimous that de Gaulle did not
represent the true feeling and sentiments of the French.
Thus in the eyes of the State Department de Gaulle represen
ted a group that had no

mandate from the French people.

Plus this, he had no definite political program and was
proving difficult to work with in building up a resistance
program even outside of France. 24
In August Admiral Leahy was chosen by the President to
assume the duties of Chief of Staff and immediately his com
petency was questioned in view of what he had accomplished
at Vichy.

The President's own estimation of Leahy and

what he had accomplished at Vichy was expressed in a letter
to the Admiral in early April when he had said, "On the
whole, I think our rather steady pressure has been successful to date."

25

The Christian Century, after many months

of silence on the issue, agreed with the President and said,
"Admiral Leahy is an extremely competent man in whom the

24
25

Langer, op. cit., p. 257»
Welles, op. cit., p. 59«
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President has great and well grounded trust."

26

The

Nation claimed he was, "...a man who supported Petain and
even after the accession to power of Laval argued against
a break with Vichy."

27
'

Commonweal came immediately to

his defence and in a long article took both The Nation and
The New Republic to task for their continued fight against
the State Department and its Vichy policy.

The article

began as an open letter to the French asking them to wait
for the coming invasion and "...to give no inner and
irremediable consent to an order we intend to destroy."
The article then continued by saying that this:
...is a language unknown to the editorial writers of
The Nation and The New Republic...These people want
French civilians to open the second front, violence in
the Paris streets, a French revolution while we are
still in no position to give the revolutionaries any
effective support— they think the war will be won
through their argumants with our State Department.
They attack Admiral Leahy, and they have not even the
courage to admit that they are attacking the man who
sent him to France and who now has placed him in a
position of high trust. 28
The Nation immediately retaliated but took a rather odd
stand on Roosevelt.

The article was a complete reversal

of the position the magazine usually adopted in that now

^
^

Christian Century, August 5* 194-2, p. 997 •
The Nation, August 1, 194-2, p. 84-.

^ C.G. Paulding, "Paris," Commonweal, August 14-,
1942, p. 389.

-76for the first time the "blame for any mistake in foreign
policy was laid at the President’s door.

The article in

taking this position stated:
It is true that the President bears a particular
responsibility for the Spanish embargo and for the mis
carried policy toward Vichy; it is true that in the
last analysis he is responsible for the sum total of
American foreign policy, with all its mistakes of
omission and commission* Yet it remains clear beyond
a doubt that his lapses into appeasement have been by
way of surrender rather than through choice. 29
Both The Nation and Commonweal continued this battle of
words for the next month.

The main contention that Common

weal tried to make was that if the Petain group were to go
and the United States broke off relations then a rabid Nazi
such as Doriot and Deat would take over and this would mean
XQ
war with Prance.
The Nation, on the other hand, claimed
that to support both Vichy and de Gaulle at the same time
was contradictory and thus the aid that was being rendered
7.1

was uneffective since both factions offosed each other. v
At this point it seems that both these positions are right
and that the controversy is unsolvable.

But one should

notice that the State Department recognized this contradic-

29

Robert Bendiner, "Who is the State Department,"
The Nation, August 15, 194-2, p. 126.
50
C.G. Paulding, "Speaking Practically," Common
weal , September 11, 194-2, p. 4-85.
51

Preda Kirchwey, "Hapsburg Hopes," The Nation,
October 24-, 194-2, p. 401.
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tion and that their position in the middle left the depart
ment with the option of choice when the moment was most
opportune.
In the next two months there was to be much switching
of positions by the liberals.

In October The Christian

Century, which until now had said nothing about de Gaulle,
half-heartedly opposed him as a future French leader in an
article that said:
General de Gaulle's importance as a symbol of
French resistance to Nazi tyranny is generally ad
mitted.
But grave questions arise as soon as it is
proposed to commit postwar France to his leadership.
Here, apparently, is another of the taxing problems
which will confront the United Nations when the time
for peace-making comes. 32
The New Republic. then surprisingly, on November 2 publish
ed a statement that said, "We do not belong with those who
feel that there are no strategic reasons for appeasing
Vichy.

Undoubtedly the secret files of the State Department

contain many such reasons..."

Later in the same article the

magazine further stated, "Many Americans are beginning to
ask when we will gather the fruits of our long continued
55
devious policy toward Vichy." ^

Americans were not to

have to wait much longer for these fruits for at the moment
some of them were reading the words quoted above troop ships

^

The Christian Century. October 7* 194-2, p. 1205.
The New Republic, November 2, 194-2, p. 564-.

were heading toward North Africa in Operation "Torch.

CHAPTER VI
THE POLICY ENDS
November-Deeember, 194-2
On November 8, 1942 American forces landed in North
Africa and the Vichy policy came to an end when Marshal
Petain broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.
Before the landing, however, there were many plans initiated
that were to have a bearing on the policy and its immediate
aftereffects.

In Spetember, for instance, Roosevelt decid

ed to find a French leader to administer the conquered area
until the war ended.

General Giraud was the man finally

chosen since it was felt he was outside both the Vichy and
the de Gaulle camps having been in a German prison until
his escape the previous April.

Both General de Gaulle and

General Giraud had been discussed.

In comparing these two

men Roosevelt once said:
General Giraud is the type of French military man who
loves his country and is not in any way a politician,
but a good soldier. General de Gaulle is a good
soldier, patriotic yes, devoted to his country, but
on the other hand, he is a politician and a fanatic
and there are, I think, in him almost the makings of
a dictator. 1

^ Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York:
Harper, 1949) p. 281.
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-80Meanwhile, since April of 1941 Robert Murphy and his
aides had veen quietly doing their job of administering the
North African aid program and spying for the United States.
Many contacts with underground leaders had been made in this
time and just two weeks before the invasion General Mark
Clark secretly landed in North Africa to meet with these
leaders and lay the final plans for the invasion.

Since it

was an American operation all final decisions were made by
the President.

Roosevelt decided to exclude the Free French

from the operation for several reasons.

In the first place,

in two previous operations into Vichy territory, at Dakar
and in Syria, de Gaullists forces had met fierce resistance
from French opponents.

It was thus decided on this one

point alone that to include them in this particular opera
tion would be tantamount to precipitating a civil war in
the area.

Secondly, it was known that his organization was

well Infiltrated by Vichy and German spies and thus might be
a source of leakage if the Free French were included in the
planning.

Also, because of de Gaulle's actions at St.

Pierre-Miquelon and in Syria with the British, it was felt
that he could not be trusted.

In a letter to Churchill, in

which he advised the Prime Minister of his decision,
Roosevelt said, "I consider it essential that de Gaulle be
kept out of the picture and be permitted to have no infor
mation whatever, regardless of how irritated or irritating

-81he may become."

p

General de Gaulle was not informed of the

operation until troops were actually pouring ashore and

the

reader can well imagine his reaction.
Just before the invasion President Roosevelt had sent
a personal message to Marshal Petain via the American
charge d'affaires at Vichy to be delivered only after the
operation had begun.
purpose

The message read in part, "My clear

is to support and aid the Prench authorities and

their administration...1 need not tell you that the ultim
ate and greater aim is the liberation of Prance and its
Empire from the Axis yoke."

When the message was delivered

the marshal immediately penned a reply that was very unco
operative and said, "You knew that we would defend the
Empire against any aggressor...You knew that I would keep my
word.

We have been attacked, and we shall defend ourselves.

That is the order I am issuing."

But as he handed this

reply to Pinckney Tuck, the American charge d'affaires, it
is said that he gave him a knowing tap on the shoulder as
if to say, "This is only for the record."

Nevertheless,

the Vichy forces in North Africa did resist the American
landing and to the surprise of General Eisenhower, who had
charge of the operation, the French leaders in the area

2

Langer, op. cit., p. 290.

^ Ibid., op. cit., p. 3^9*

-82would have nothing to do with General Giraud.

But there

was an even greater surprise in store for the Americans for
Admiral Darlan had, at this most inopportune of times, de
cided to come to Algiers to visit his ailing son.
Darlan was immediately captured and ordered, since he
was the French Supreme Military Commander, to give the or
der to cease fire.
tacted Petain.

This he refused to do until he had con

Less than an hour after Petain sent the

ahove message to Roosevelt he was answering Darlan's re
quest for orders by saying, "I have received your message
through the Admiralty and am glad you are on the spot.
what action you like and keep me informed.
you have my complete confidence."

Ll

Take

You know that

This, it would seem,

left the way open for Darlan to'negotiate with the Ameri
cans but he hesitated wanting to make sure that they had
landed in such strength as to be able to control the situa
tion and to stabilize it.

He maintained this attitude of

aloofness for three days and when finally faced with the
possibility of being made a prisoner of war he decided to
negotiate.

Before the negotiations began Darlan ordered all

French forces in North Africa to desist in resisting the
Americans.

The outcome of the talks was that Darlan was

placed in charge of civil functions of the local government

q.

Aron, op. cit. , p. 506.
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and General Giraud was put in command of all the French
military forces.
Meanwhile, in Washington on the day of the landings
Secretary Hull had summoned press correspondents to the
State Department for one of the most ill-advised conferences
of the war.

Hull took this opportunity to settle accounts

with those who had criticized the government's past policy
toward Vichy.

He interpreted recent events in the light of

what had gone on before in an attempt to justify his pre
vious actions.
Vichy policy.

He said there had been five purposes to the
First it was an opportunity for the govern

ment to receive highly important information from inside
German-controlled territory.

Secondly, the maintenance of

close relations with the French encouraged them to oppose
Hitlerism.

Third, it kept alive the basic French concepts

of freedom, looking toward the restoration of "free instit
utions for France as they existed before the German occupa
tion. "

Fourth, the personal contact with Vichy helped them

to resist German demands for an enlargement of the armistice,
looking ultimately toward full collaboration and the surren
der of the French fleet.

Finally, and this Hull claimed was

the most important, was that it paved the way for the invasion that was then taking place.

5

But as we shall see his

^ Danger, op. cit., pp. 366-367.

-84gloating was premature for the worse criticism of the Vichy
policy was yet to come.

Yet, there was to he one benefit

in that some of the liberals accepted his argument and this
tended to split the most ardent of the liberal camp.
Immediately the liberal magazines picked up the bait and
began to swing their critical pens.

The New Eepublic, tak-

i

ing the lead away from The Nation for the first time, was
the first to comment.

The article began by saying that to

point to the North African invasion as proof of the wisdom
of the Vichy policy was "to prejudge the outcome."

Further

it said, "If the Vichy regime exerts only a formal amount
of force to save its face, the State Department policy may
have been partly justified." ^

In the same issue another

writer commented further:
On the other hand, it is certain that the policy
frittered away much good will on the part of the anti
fascist French, and raised doubts all over the world
about our war aims...History may throw more light on
the wisdom of our policy. But there is no assurance
that the State Department was right. 7
Later, however, The New Republic in a long article condemn
ed the secretary of State for his statements.

The article

stated in part:
The State Department seems unduly concerned with fight
ing an internal war against its critics. So anxious

ST

The New Republic, November 16, 1942, p. 625.
^ The New Republic, November 16, 1942, p. 624.

-85ha s Secretary Hull been to prove the rightness of his
past appeasement policy that he has allowed himself to
issue a statement revealing the most unabashed Machiavellianisms and has hereby played directly into the
hands of Axis propagandists. °
The Hew Masses, in its turn, concemned the secretary and
predicted that no one would take Mr. Hull's statement
seriously.

This writer claimed the policy had done the

opposite of what Hull claimed were its achievements.

The

article said in reality the policy had helped, "...confuse,
discourage and demobilize the French people and enabled
him [Hitler] to maintain valuable espionage centers on
American soil in the Vichy embassy and consulates." 9y
It was rather odd that on this particular issue The
Nation waited two weeks before saying anything on the sub
ject.

In the first article the writer bluntly stated:
General Eisenhower's forces have rescued North Africa
from the Axis and the State Department from some of
its severest critics. The chances are excellent that
North Africa will stay rescued, but I am not sure
about the State Department.

In this article the writer claimed General Clark had paved
the way for the invasion and not Murphy and his aides.
this is obviously untrue. ^

® Ibid., November 25, 1942, p. 659*
^ Ihe New Masses, November 24, 1942, p. 3«
Robert Bendiner, "Was Hull Right About Vichy,”
The Nation, November 21, 1942, pp. 552-534.
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The first criticism was mild compared to what was to
come when the announcement was made that Admiral Darlan had
been taken into the American camp.

Though'the Vichy policy

was officially over the magazine took the position that
Darlan was still tied up with it and that in reality the
policy had not been ended at all.

Every magazine but Common

weal had some comment to make on the Darlan appointment.
The Nation simply said, "Prostitutes are used; they are
seldom loved.

Even less frequently are they honored." ^

The Christian Century asked, "If this is what is to happen
after American troops 'liberate* territory from the Nazi
menace, then in the name of the Pour Freedoms what are we
fighting for ?"

12

The New Masses said there.is every reason

to use Darlan if he would help our cause but it warned:
...Let us make certain that we do not permit this dis
credited politician to use us in order to resurrect
a new Vichy, obstruct the preparations for opening a
second front in Europe, and short-circuit the activity
of the French people at the very moment that they are
springing to join us in the great struggle against
Hitlerism. 13
The New Republic did not object to receiveing the surrender
of such persons as Darlan, "when it will save lives and

Freda Kirchwey, "America's First Quisling," The
Nation, November 21, 1942, p. 529.

IP
The Christian Century, November 25. 1942, pp.
1448-1450.
The New Masses, November 24, 1942, p. 5*
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But, the article went on, "...to strike a military

bargain with them is different from welding a political
partnership with them."

14-

Public opinion grew extremely indignant both to Great
Britain and the United States against what most people
considered a stupid mistake on the part of the State Depart
ment.

But, oddly enough, on this particular occasion the

State Department was entirely innocent since it was the
military, that is General Eisenhower, who decided to in
clude Darlan in the government of North Africa.

Finally,

criticism grew to such a height that President Roosevelt
was forced to made some statement on the matter.

On Nov

ember 17 the President said:
I have accepted General Eisenhower's political
arrangements made for the time being in Northern and
Western Africa.
I thoroughly understand and approve
the feeling in the United States and in Great Britain
and among all the other United Nations that in view of
the history of the past two years no permanent arrange
ment should be made with Admiral Darlan...The present
temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only
a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress
of battle. 15
But if the President, or anyone olse, thought this explan
ation would act as a brake on the liberal criticism they
were sorely mistaken.

14

15

The New Republic questioned the

The New Republic, November 23» 1942, p. 3*
Danger, op. cit., p. 327.
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President's statement by saying:
The attack on North Africa does not suddenly make
every previous action of our government perfect, as
some official and unofficial press agents in Wash
ington would like to pretend. Some of the earlier
criticism, even of the State Department's famous
policy of appeasing Vichy, still stands, and as to
other parts, the best you can say is that it is too
early to tell whether our official attitude was ex
pedient or not. 16
In another issue this magazine said North Africa should not
be governed by Darlan or anyone that the United States had
chosen but rather by a civil and military group chosen by
all-the United Nations.

17

In still another issue The New

Republic continued with, "...the North African blow was to
have freed the French spirit but it has, by our acceptance
of Darlan's aid on his own terms, actually depressed and
confused it..."

This article went on to say that those

waiting to be liberated in Europe will now question whether
the Americans
ed ?

would accept "quislings" wherever they

land

The Nation, in its turn, stated:
What doubtless appeared a reasonable military
expedient is proving a costly political blunder, and
various government spokesman in Washington are trying
to mitigate the effect of the transaction by explain
ing that it is only a temporary deal at worse, due to
be abandoned as soon as its immediate purposes have

16

The New Republic, November 30, 1942, p. 713•

17 Ibid.. December 28, 1942, p. 840
18 Ibid., December 7, 1942, p. 729*
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19

The New Masses throughout December grew increasingly
irritated at the deal made with Darlan.

On the 8th it said,

"The continuance of any arrangement with Darlan, let alone
a further strengthening of his position, must be question20
ed."
On the 15th its writers coined a new word, "Darlanism," and said it is a "secret weapon forged to block
offensive operations into Europe, to dismember the allied
coalition, to set the stage for a new batch of criminals to
replace the old."

21

And finally on the 29th it stated:

'Darianism' is a kind of pathological politics to
be cured not by cleansing but by surgery. The alter
native is to run the risk of a plague whose ravages
are without limit. 22
Meanwhile southern France had been occupied by the
Germans and on November 27 the main portion of the French
fleet gathered at Toulon was scuttled.

Commenting on the

latter incident The Nation said:
...sunk beneath the waters of Toulon Harbor, along
with the French navy, is a myth that bedeviled our
foreign policy for more than two years— the myth that
it was necessary for the United States to play ball

19

Kirchwey, op. cit., "Quisling," The Nation, Nov
ember 21, 1942, p. 529.

20 "How Long is Temporary ?", The New Masses, Dec
ember 8, 1942, p. 21.
21

22

The New Masses, December 15, 1942, p. 21.
Ibid., December 29, 1942, p. 4.

-90with Vichy in order to keep the French fleet out of
Hitler's hands. 23
Within the liberal camp there were things happening also,
for dessension had struck their ranks.

The new position

taken by many liberals was that maybe the State Department
had been right.

Others felt the department should not be

completely condemned until all the facts were known.

A

good example of this dissension can be found in the December
14 issue of The Hew Republic, where in one article a writer
states i
...it ought to be admitted that the official treatment
of Vichy could have been due, not to secret sympathy
with Fascists or lack of aggressiveness, but to a be
lief that this was the best way to serve our military
requirements pending the time when an offensive could
be undertaken...We can argue about the wisdom of the
course adopted from now until doomsday without settl
ing it, but it must be admitted that we still do not
have all the facts accessible to the State Department,
and that we are not Justified in questioning the
motives of all those responsible. 24
In another article in the same issue a writer blandly stated,
"Looking back over the past ten years, we can see that the
liberals, ill informed or not, were right in practically
every instance and the State Department was wrong."

25
^

Even The Ration, which had veen the bulwark of the

23 Q7pe Nation, December 5» 19^-2, p. 604.
24

George Soule, "Liberals and the State Department,"
The Hew Republic, December 14, 1942, p. 788.
^

The Hew Republic, December 14, 1942, p. 780.

-91Vichy policy opponents, found itself under attack from with
in and without.

In two separate issues full pages of letters

disagreeing with its current stand were printed.

But The

Nation would not give up its position but instead condemned
those who would criticize.

In a long article that went into

all aspects of the problem, including the Darlan controver
sy, the writer ended by saying:
The opposition expressed by The Nation to Darlan's
appointment as military and civil chief in North
Africa was received with total disapproval by many
liberals...The mass surrender of the liberals in this
country, their determination to believe that military
expediency and political wisdom are identical, their
rush to follow the leader wherever he may be heading— ■
these phenomenon are ill omens for the future of
democracy. 26
Another writer for The New Republic also took somewhat the
same stand when he wrote:
Many liberals have failed to grasp the larger issue in
volved in this criticism and have bent over eagerly to
take their dozen strokes of punishment. A number of
outstanding liberals, concerned with the integrity of
their movement, still insist that it is in our best
interest to admit that we were wrong in our critic
ism. 27
By the end of 194-2 the liberals were openly fighting
among themselves over this issue.

One aspect of the problem

was removed, however, on December 24- when Admiral Darlan

26

Freda Kirchwey, "Darlan and American Liberals,"
The Nation. December 5* 194-2, pp. 559-560.

^

The New Republic. November 30, 194-2, pp. 698-699*
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was killed by an assassin's bullet.

How ironical was Pres

ident Roosevelt's statement when he called Darlan a "temp
orary expedient."

After Darlan's death few would still

argue that the Vichy policy was still in operation but still
there were its aftereffects.

As some liberals saw it the

continual snubbing of de Gaulle, by naming Giraud to take
Darlan's now vacant position, was a direct result of the
policy.

To go into all the policy's aftereffects and their

ramifications, however, is a project far beyond the scope
of this paper.
ended.

With the death of Darlan the main problem

What was to come after will be left for future

historians to tell.

CHAPTER 711
THE BALANCE SHEET
There are many things to he learned from a study of
this type.

The most obvious from an evaluative standpoint

is that all the liberals were not in the same camp.

From

the beginning Commonweal stood by its initial contention
that the State Department's policy was the right one to
follow.

The Nation on the other hand believed Just as

strongly that the policy was all wrong.

The New Masses

and The New Republic at different times vacillated on the
issue.

One was never sure where The Christian Century

stood.

As an adjunct to the problem, the question of wheth

er to recognize de Gaulle or not received either approval
or disapproval depending upon what each magazine thought of
the main controversy.
Another lesson to be learned from this study stems
from the State Department's contention that these magazines
did not know all the facts and thus their criticism was in
accurate and invalid.

This study has proven that this was

true, especially in the case of The Nation.

But, because

these magazines did not know all the facts does not mean
they should have relinquished their critical functions.
For to have relinquished their functions as critics would
-

93

-

-

have made them impotent.
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Perhaps one could say these mag

azines were expressing their frustration, at not knowing the.
facts, by the amount of criticism they produced.

An ex

pression of this frustration was the limits to which their
criticism carried them, even to the point at times of leav
ing truthfulness and objectivity, the prime journalistic
virtues, behind.

But this tells us nothing about the main

question involved in this study.
in criticizing the Vichy policy ?

Was the liberal justified
In the first place, since

the magazines took many different stands on as many occas
ions, one would have to first decide what part of the
policy, or occasion, this question should be applied to.
On the St. Pierre-Miquelon episode and the Petain promises
in early 1942 there is no question that the liberals did
have a good argument to support their case.

On the other

hand, their criticism of the shipments to Weygand and the
question of whether or not to recognize de Gaulle was not,
in most cases, warranted.

In the Weygand case, for instance,

no one will now argue that the United States did not receive
much more than was given.

As for de Gaulle, emotion pro

bably might have been the better part of valor on the State
Department's part.

But, look at what the United States

would have lost had it been decided to recognize de Gaulle
and his movement as the sovereign government of Prance.
If the United States had taken this move in early 1941, it

-

95

-

is apparent now, the group favoring collaboration would have
gained early control over the Vichy government.

Secondly,

the French fleet would have passed into the hands of the
Germans.

Thirdly, Spain, in all likelihood, would have

succumbed to French and German pressure and this would have
closed the Mediterranean to both the British and the
Americans.

How long victory would then have been postponed

is anyone's guess.
The lesson to be gained from this, then, is that the
Vichy policy cannot be taken in its entirety and condemned.
To evaluate properly the criticism of the policy one should
take each incident, as has been done in this thesis, and
evaluate it on its own merits.
tion, then should be obvious.

The answer to the main ques
No, the liberal critics were

not justified in criticizing the State Department for its
policy toward Vichy.

For this policy was not just one

position that remained stable throughout the period under
study.

As has been shown, the policy was always evolving.

Add to this the fact that the liberals oftentimes did not
have all the facts and this judgement can be seen as
warranted.
Another question to be answered is whether their crit
icism effected State Department policy.

In the case of

Vichy, after examining the facts, it can be seen the State
Department was prompted in its actions merely by day to day

-96happenings in France and not by what the Liberals were say
ing*

On certain matters, however, such as material aid to

de Gaulle, one can probably say the meagre allowances and
recognition he did receive were partly due to the efforts
of the liberal writers that favored him.

On the matter of

material aid to de Gaulle the writers of certain magazines
seemed to be fighting the old battle for the Loyalists of
Spanish Civil War days.

Similiar to the Loyalist case, de

Gaulle was also refused arms and recognition.

In de

Gaulle's case, however, the government's attitude changed
and eventually he was to receive full recognition.

The

final question on the matter of de Gaulle should be— what
would the United States have gained had all its support been
thrown to the Free French from the beginning ?

Besides

losing all that has been mentioned before the United States
would have gained nothing in comparison.

De Gaulle, in

1940, it must be remembered, was a comparatively little
known figure not only outside of France but within as well.
De Gaulle owed much of his popularity, during the war, to
the British propaganda office and many in this country re
ceived their only information about him from this source.
In the first part of this study it was apparent that much,
if not all, of The Nations facts on de Gaulle and on Vichy
stemmed from British sources.
The liberals acquired their name for stands on other
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issues and the problem in this particular study is not that
they were being "liberal" as such, but rather that the
source from which the criticism came from has historically
been labelled "liberal!';

The liberal magazines in this

particular study, however, could have been replaced by just
about any other five different magazines or mewspapers.
Their positions on the individual incidents were that varied
at times.
In the final analysis, however, to get back to the main
point, it cannot be disputed that no French ship was ever
taken over and manned by the Germans against the United
States.

This, it will be remembered, was the first concern

of the President when it appeared that France might fall in
1940.

With this concern the Vichy policy began and later

was to germinate the thoughts that originated this paper.
The final judgement ?

Maybe a statement Marshal Pet

ain made at his treason trial would best answer that
question. The marshal simply said, "God and posterity will
make answer to your judgement of me," ^

So also will they

make the final judgement on the American Vichy policy, the
liberals and their criticism.

^ Farmer, op. cit., p. 4-.
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